On blessings and on assisted dying

The Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith has published a Declaration on the meaning of blessings, particularly addressing the question of how blessings might be appropriately used with same sex couples and couples whose marriage situations are not fully in accord with Catholic teaching. News reporting inevitably offers a part of the whole, so I do think it is worthwhile going to the website of the Holy See to read the entire document itself: Fiducia Supplicans. There are some careful distinctions that can be easily lost in reporting.

Before highlighting the possibilities of blessings for same sex couples etc,  the Declaration offers a concrete affirmation of Catholic teaching on the nature of marriage:

Therefore, rites and prayers that could create confusion between what constitutes marriage—which is the “exclusive, stable, and indissoluble union between a man and a woman, naturally open to the generation of children”[6]—and what contradicts it are inadmissible. This conviction is grounded in the perennial Catholic doctrine of marriage; it is only in this context that sexual relations find their natural, proper, and fully human meaning. The Church’s doctrine on this point remains firm.

And, subtly, there is also a clear intention that the style of informal blessings envisaged for same sex couples or couples whose marriage situations are not fully in accord with Catholic teaching, is given to those who (my italics added)

....recognizing themselves to be destitute and in need of his help—do not claim a legitimation of their own status, but who beg that all that is true, good, and humanly valid in their lives and their relationships be enriched, healed, and elevated by the presence of the Holy Spirit. 

And correspondingly:

How often, through a pastor’s simple blessing, which does not claim to sanction or legitimize anything, can people experience the nearness of the Father, beyond all “merits” and “desires”? 

The blessing of a same sex couple that recently took place at an Anglican Church in Felixstowe clearly has, and was seen as having, the character of a legitimization of the status of the couple involved - and would not be countenanced by Fiducia Supplicans. 

The BBC news website is reporting that  Esther Rantzen, being treated currently for a Stage 4 cancer, has joined the Dignitas assisted dying clinic in Switzerland.

Speaking about her decision to join Dignitas, Dame Esther said it was driven in part by her wish that her family's "last memories of me" are not "painful because if you watch someone you love having a bad death, that memory obliterates all the happy times".

For those, like myself, who do spend time with patients and family/friends as a patient comes to the end of their lives, there are two elements of Esther Rantzen's words that prompt a sadness. Whilst accompanying a loved one as they die is often going to be challenging, we should not assume that it is going to be "bad". It is for those who surround the dying person to use their time with them to create positive memories in that time; and this is a responsibility that is wider than just the immediate carers. It is a matter of creating a culture, that runs alongside the provision of good clinical, palliative care. In visiting with patients and family/friends in these circumstances, there is a very particular opportunity for them to share anew the memories that have been lived before, as well as living together the present experience. It is a question of accompanying, so that the memories of this time will not be ones that exist to the exclusion of all other memories, and so that they are memories that are enhancing rather than debilitating.

Abortion and Afterwards

In 1988, a few weeks after I had had an abortion, I became destructive and emotionally unstable - moody, tearful, lethargic - I was unable to forget or come to terms with what had happened I had never experienced anything like it before and was both surprised and frightened by the depth and complexity of my feelings. I needed to talk, to hear other women's experiences, to know why they had chosen abortion and how they had coped. I discovered it was a taboo subject, so I turned to books. There was little there ...

I resolved to write a book of my own for my own therapy. And slowly, through words, I began to understand by feelings, and used my knowledge of therapy to guide me through my grief. Through writing I began to understand the enormity of my experience and what had happened to my relationship - I became disturbed at how we 'the aborters' were treated and viewed by others. I had come through my experience and integrated it into my life - I had survived the worst crisis of my life. But what of others?

.... All of the women, and men, I have spoken to  or whose letters I read, have shared, for the most part, a highly distressing and painful experience. They shared their experiences for two reasons:

- it was the first time anyone had asked them about their feelings and wanted to listen;

- in the hope that their experiences might help other women cope.

The above is a significant part of the Preface to a book entitled Abortion and afterwards, written by Vanessa Davies, and first published in 1991. The book was not written from a pro-life perspective; rather it was intended as a source of practical guidance for those facing a decision about abortion, with perhaps a particular target audience amongst those women who make a decision for an abortion. My own copy (second hand) has the stamp "Family Planning Association Information and Research Centre" on the inside front cover.

In the light of recent media coverage of Crisis Pregnancy Centres, Vanessa Davies' book has interesting aspects. Part Two, for example, is entitled "Afterwards: The Healing Process". The first chapter of this part addresses  "Feelings", recognising that "depression, guilt, anger, sadness, euphoria, relief, resentment, anxiety and grief" (p.121) are common themes in the experiences of women who have had an abortion. The second chapter in Part Two carries the title "Grief". The chapters describe, and suggest ways of coping with, these feelings.

It is interesting that a book written from a point of view that is essentially supportive of abortion recognises that a significant process of healing may be necessary after a woman has had an abortion. It gives part of a context for the work of pregnancy counselling services that do not refer for abortion.

Archie Battersbee

 I have not been able to follow the events of the Archie Battersbee case as they unfolded. I have also been very aware that the case might have involved specific circumstances, not known to the general public, that would affect a judgement of the outcome of the legal case.

A reliable source of comment is the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, who have three posts on their website about the case (linked here in reverse time order): Press Release on the Passing Away of Archie Battersbee ; A Comment on the Latest High Court Judgement on Archie Battersbee; Press Statement on Archie Battersbee – “Very Likely Dead” is not Dead Enough. I think it is worth reading carefully all three of their posts.

There are some aspects of the case that as highlighted by the Anscombe Bioethics Centre that have a wider significance. One is the role of parents as the responsible agents of the best interests of their children.

The Centre has commented frequently that English law habitually fails to recognise the responsibilities and rights of the parents in cases relating to the medical treatment and care of children. This is shown in the present case by the appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of Archie, as though the parents are less well-qualified to represent his interests. Decision-making should not be taken from the parents unless and until they have been shown to be unreasonable and a threat to their child. They remain the people who know their child best.

 Another aspect reflects how a widespread societal perception can be too readily applied by judicial decision, whether or not it is reflected in the specific instance.

If Archie has no hope of recovery, then it seems prima facie reasonable for the hospital to seek to withdraw intensive care (if ordinary treatment and basic care are still provided). The practical conclusion of this judgement may well be defensible. However, the speculation that such withdrawal is what Archie “might have wanted”, and the claim that remaining on intensive care “compromises Archie’s dignity”, involve projections of views or feelings onto him in a way that is both unwarranted and ethically deeply problematic.

It is possible to see here how a widespread societal acceptance of a view about the circumstances of dying can affect, by way of legal decision, the care of those who do not share that view. 

Different narratives: abortion

As I have followed the coverage of the leak of a draft decision of the US Supreme Court with regard to the Roe vs Wade judgement on abortion, a number of thoughts have come to mind.

The first has been about the way in which the relationship between the notion of the rule of law and the exercise of political office is perceived. So for, example, President Biden has very quickly expressed his concerns (or, more honestly, opposition?) to the striking down of Roe vs Wade that the leaked draft seems to foreshadow. And Vice-President Kamala Harris has been even more explicit. It seems legitimate that those in high public office should attack a possible court ruling, rather than indicating their compliance with the rule of law that might result. 

The public narrative - and it is there in both President Biden's and Vice-President Harris' remarks - speaks in terms of women having a right to choose, and in their having a right to have control over their bodies. This right to choose is seen as a "women's right" to be defended. There is a literature, from authors on both sides of the debate about legalized abortion, that describes the experiences of women who have had abortions. The examples of this literature on my own bookshelves are not particularly recent, but the themes involved were referenced by a speaker towards the end of BBC Radio 4's Today programme this morning, who cited a book she had viewed in a visit to an abortion clinic where women had written their thoughts about their experiences. There are a wide range of reasons that lie behind women deciding to have abortions, some examples being family pressures, financial pressures, unsupportive partners or partners with addictions, effect on education or career prospects; and there can be very different emotional responses arising from those decisions. 

In other words, there are multiple narratives, not one single narrative. And in many of those narratives there are one or more constraints being exerted on the woman's freedom in choosing for or against abortion; they are not exercising a right to choose in the real sense of that phrase. Our conversation about abortion, if it is to respect and reflect the real experiences of women, cannot be one about a "right to choose". It has to include the full range of narratives; and, even remaining neutral with regard to the rights and wrongs as such of abortion, that wider conversation could be expected to lead to change in the practice of abortion.

Interestingly, the pro-life speaker in this morning's Today programme interview (Melanie McDonagh) was insistent on our talking about abortion as the "killing of a foetus" rather than using a term like "healthcare procedure", and in recognising that the foetus is a human being in various stages of development. Our conversation needs to reflect that there is this foetus as well as the woman in the situation. From my own reading, the difficult emotional responses that some women experience occur from precisely this recognition.

The full interview from the Today programme can be found here, beginning at 2:22. It will be available for the next 29 days. The BBC news website has a page in which six women from America give their responses to the Supreme Court leak: Roe v Wade: US women divided on leaked abortion ruling. Perhaps Catherine Nix's observation that, whether abortion is legal or not, there will still be women with unexpected pregnancies who need help and support is the most thoughtful response.

A final thought. One of my take away points from the #MeToo movement, and from recent concerns here in the UK about violence against women, has been that the safety of women requires men to take an increased responsibility for the behaviour that they show towards women. And yet the language of a "woman's right to choose" in terms of abortion appears to take an opposite stance, suggesting an autonomy of women from men's behaviours. (As do adverts for the morning after pill, with a strap line "It's my morning after".)

Film Review: The Phantom of the Open

Yesterday evening, we went to see the film The Phantom of the Open. It is one of those films that has the descriptor "based on a true story" and, though the film portrays Maurice Flitcroft in a very endearing way, the true story, at least as presented on Wikipedia (here), suggests a somewhat different character.

When it was shown at the London Film Festival in October 2021, the Festival described the film as follows:

At the age of 46, happy-go-lucky crane operator and all-round lovable family man Maurice Flitcroft (Mark Rylance) feels it’s time to try his hand at something new. Deciding on a whim that golf is his new calling, the budding sportsman sets his sights on mastering the game. But Maurice is not a man to do things by halves, and in a turn of events that you just couldn’t make up, he secures a coveted spot in the qualifying round of the 1976 British Open. With the enduring support of his loving wife and disco-dancing sons, Maurice borrows some books, buys the clobber and gets hold of a set of clubs. There’s only one problem; he has never played a round in his life. Adapted by Simon Farnaby from his book ‘The Phantom of The Open: Maurice Flitcroft, the World’s Worst Golfer’ (co-written by Scott Murray), Craig Roberts’ film is a heartfelt celebration of an eternal optimist who never let his sporting inadequacies stand in the way of his dreams. You’ll laugh. You’ll cry. All hail the underdog!

The title sequence to the film offers a beautiful account of how Maurice and Jean Flitcroft meet, with Maurice observing to Jean about the son she already has out of wedlock that "he has a father now" (as the film observes, this was a much bigger thing at that time than it would be now); the couple buying a terraced house in Barrow in Furness; and showing the children growing up. It was so lovely to watch that I completely missed the names in the title sequence.

There are a couple of subtleties in this family story that those who were young in the 1970's and 1980's might spot. The eldest son goes to university and gains a degree, later being employed in senior management at the Vickers shipyard where his father worked as a crane operator. For many working class families at the time, young students at university were the first from their families to have the chance of higher education, so this echoes with those of us for whom that was the case. The threat of redundancies is also shown overhanging the shipyard, though Maurice is described by Wikipedia as retiring from the yard rather than being made redundant as the film portrays. Again, in the industrial areas of the north of England, job losses were a major feature of the 1970's and early 1980's. 

Most of the humour revolves around Maurice's attempts at playing golf and trying to get a foothold in the golfing environment. Neither are very successful. A highlight is perhaps Maurice's conversation with a young Seve Ballesteros in the locker room before his first appearance in qualifying for the Open, which ends with him observing that his golf is much better than his (very makeshift) Spanish.

Through the course of the film, there is a very interesting portrayal of a relationship between husband and wife, and of their relationship with their children. The behaviours, with their ups and downs, are reflective of working class life, though perhaps a little stereotyped. It is these relationships that provide the very moving points in the film, and give a positive view of a family life even when it is lived in difficult times. The older son, Michael, as he has risen in the Vickers shipyard, has distanced himself from his father because of the ridicule surrounding him and potentially adverse effect for his career. But at a key moment at the end of a commercial pitch to Japanese investors, when his boss jumps in to deny that Michael is related to Maurice Flitcroft because he thinks it will cause an adverse outcome, Michael owns up. He then uses the plane ticket provided for a visit to America to join his other family members there... a very moving reconciliation of a prodigal son.

The nostalgia is provided with great care throughout the film. Manual typewriters (not a computer in sight), lunchtime sandwiches at work, old fashioned telephones (not the slightest hint of a mobile phone), smoking, television sets of the time, home furnishings and fashion very much of the time.

There are excellent performances from Mark Rylance and Sally Hawkins, and their twins are portrayed very well by Christian and Jonah Lees. Altogether a film that is very well worth seeing.

March for Life: London 2021

I was not able to take part in this year's March for Life in London on 4th September because of a family commitment - but a report of the march can be found here: March for Life UK - A Resurgence of Life. Videos of the day can be found here: The Talks and Highlights. The videos include testimonies during the rally in Parliament Square, and the talk from Bishop Paul Swarbrick, of Lancaster Diocese.

‘All lives matter! It’s not that some matter more than others but some do need that bit more love, they are so easily overlooked.’

Assisted dying/euthanasia: three thoughts

Earlier this afternoon, I listened to an item on BBC Radio 4's PM programme. Featuring Baroness Meacher and Robert Winston, it discussed reasons for and against proposed legislation to allow assisted dying/euthanasia. If you are reading this within 29 days of my posting, you will be able to listen to the item on BBC Sounds, here. The item occurs immediately after the news summary at the beginning of the programme.

In two distinct ways, it was the references to suffering and burdensomeness in the discussion that have prompted the following thoughts.

What does it mean if I suggest that "I do not want to be a burden on others"?

For a person who experiences an illness that is, to a small or to a greater extent, life limiting, there is merit in keeping as much independence and self-sufficiency in daily living as long as that is possible. But, as with those who have good health, that independence and self-sufficiency is nevertheless lived in a relation to others and not in an individualised bubble - it encounters bus drivers, shop staff, etc, the people of daily living. Our lives are shared with others, even when we are in good health.

There is nevertheless a graciousness in accepting assistance when that becomes necessary, be that social care or medical care. This graciousness has a reciprocal dimension - it does not just exist from the point of view of the person experiencing illness but also finds a reflecting mirror in the people who provide care. And it does not extend just to those who might provide care to a particular patient but extends to wider society too. 

The recognition of this reciprocal graciousness is sadly absent from our society's conversation about end of life care and so, for some, the conversation is framed in terms of being a burden to others. That framing is often exclusively voiced from the point of view of the patient who is ill, which is to neglect the place of those who are potential carers. Surely our society needs to be much better in encouraging this reciprocal graciousness in our care for those experiencing serious illness.

Experiencing illness as you approach the end of life.

Perhaps we could all do well to think to some extent about what it means to experience serious illness and come to the end of our lives. What it does do is create a very special - and that does not mean that it is easy - time for a patient and their relatives/friends to have together. Clearly, different people will experience this differently, depending upon their individual situations; some will find it more difficult than others. But, at least for many, there is an opportunity for a specially shared time together with the patient who is coming to the end of their life. [This isn't theory on my part, but something I have been privileged to see a number of times.] 

What would happen to this time if, because assisted dying/euthanasia were legally permitted, that possibility were admitted to the conversation? Or if, as has happened with legalized abortion, the offering of the opportunity for assisted dying/euthanasia comes to be seen as a normal practice of health care on the part of medical professionals?

It really is not good enough to say that people would have a freedom to choose assisted dying/euthanasia or to not choose it; so why not permit it for those who would choose it. With legalised assisted dying/euthanasia, everyone is put in a position where they have to make a choice, even if that choice is implicit. Everyone's experience of the end of life is affected, and that special time is irretrievably altered for everyone.

Unnecessary suffering.

I believe that it is entirely possible with proper end of life care for a patient not to have to endure unmanageable pain. And, with sufficient commitment to pastoral care, both the patient and relatives/friends can be supported through what might be termed the anguish that accompanies the end of life. If relatives/friends are worried about unnecessary suffering by  the patient, that is a result of poor care both for the patient and for the relatives/friends. And it is not unusual for an end of life patient to "let go" when they are ready, and a key element of their care is recognising when that can come about. In the mean time, that privileged time that is the end of someone's life deserves to be respected rather than curtailed. 

My two thoughts above, of course, do also feed in to this third thought.

Matt and Gina: observations on the Zeitgeist

I suspect that the Sun newspaper's video of Matt Hancock, now the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, in an intimate clinch with a female aide will turn out to be a classic of its genre.

But it does raise a three interesting questions, not specific to the case of Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo, but with respect to a range of surrounding assumptions, what one might term "the zeitgiest".

Is consent on the part of the man and woman a sufficient condition to make an otherwise morally unjust action morally just? If we were to remove the element of consent on the part of Ms Coladangelo to the action shown in the Sun's video clip (Mr Hancock is shown squeezing her bottom), the video would provide an example of precisely the wrong behaviour of a man in a position of relative power towards a woman in the workplace that has been raised by #Me Too. News reporting suggests that both Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo were being unfaithful to their respective spouses, and the consenting nature of their office clinch does not remove the injustice towards spouses that this involves. Even if one sets this consideration aside, there remains a question as to whether or not that squeezing of the bottom in an office clinch represents a respectful behaviour of a man towards a woman, and whether the woman's consent is sufficient to overcome that lack of respectfulness.  (I don't intend this as a criticism of Mr Hancock as an individual, but as a more general observation about male/female behaviours.) 

The question is of a much wider significance, as much of the contemporary discussion about the safety of women in society, both in social life and in the workplace, focusses on educating men about the nature of consent. But if consent is not a sufficient criterion (though it will be a necessary criterion along with others) for the morality of the actions involved, a focus on consent is not going to resolve the question of the safety and wellbeing of women. We do, perhaps, need to have a conversation about what constitute the boundaries of right and wrong behaviours independently of, and in addition to, the question of consent.

Should we be indifferent to marriage in our public life? Mr Hancock's resignation has with, some emphasis, been connected to his breach of social distancing rules that he himself was responsible for drawing up. In Mr Hancock's own words:

I understand the enormous sacrifices that everybody in this country has made, that you have made, and those of us who make these rules have got to stick by them and that's why I have got to resign.

Reporting, following Mr Hancock's colleagues, have distinguished this reason for resignation from matters of his personal life. The public conversation appears to have a certain style of indifference to the lack of faithfulness to spouses and families shown by Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo; tabloid comment refers to Mr Hancock"cheating on his wife" and Ms Coladangelo as a "cheating aide", but more serious comment is keeping a discreet silence about this. Certainly it would be wrong for public conversation to consist of a witch hunt in the media or hounding on social media; charity is required in this context as in any other, and Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo just happen to represent far more publicly than is typical the circumstances of many others. A certain silence about the specific case might well be the manner in which charity is shown. 

But the BBC are carrying this morning what might be considered a piece of lazy reporting, reflecting I think reporting from the Sun, but which nevertheless is indicative:

Mr Hancock has ended his 15-year marriage to his wife, Martha, and the relationship with Ms Coladangelo is understood to be a serious one.

It would appear that Mr Hancock has left his wife with an immediate effect, announcing his departure abruptly as the Sun broke the story of his office encounter with Ms Coladangelo (according to the Sun, at least); but even in civil law, leaving aside any particular belief that one might have about the permanence of marriage vows, a marriage has not ended until a divorce has been granted.

Whilst one would not want to launch witch hunts in any individual cases, is it really healthy for society that the wider public conversation in the case of Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo should remain  indifferent to the the place of marriage in the life of society? Should not the good of marriage, and expectations around that good, be at least a part of the public conversation? 

How should we correctly understand the significance of private life for public life? There are certainly dangers to freedoms when matters of personal life are seen as necessary conditions for participation in public life. But does this mean that how people conduct themselves in their private lives is completely without significance for their public lives? A personal characteristic such as integrity is one that can be common to both a person's private and public life, for example; likewise a characteristic such as honesty.  The commonality of such characteristics to both private and public life does mean that I think we should be able to expect more from those who play a larger part in public life than might be the case of those who play a smaller part (recognising that we all risk failing to live up to expectations, those with a large public profile as much as those without). 

At the very least, I think we should recognise that private life has some significance for public life, and that this is true for all of us, even if our part in public life is relatively small. It might be of greater significance for those who have a large public profile.

Transitioning - a single narrative?

 What is now known as "gender reassignment surgery" would, in an earlier time, have been referred to as a "sex change operation". The latter term is perhaps more honest in public discussion, avoiding as it does the conflation of the idea of physiological sex to that of social presentation that occurs with the current prevalent usage of the term "gender".

In February 2008, I saw a film called Juno, starring Ellen Page (who has since transitioned to a man and is now known as Elliot Page). See here for comments relating to Juno that have appeared previously on this blog. The part played by Ellen Page in Juno, as an unexpectedly pregnant high school teenager, attracted very significant acclaim at the time the film was released.

Elliot Page has recently gained media coverage following an interview with Oprah Winfrey, in which he speaks of how liberating he found being able to have "top surgery" and so present visibly to himself as male. UK coverage can be read on the BBC news website and the Guardian newspaper website.

“I want people to know that not only has it been life-changing for me, I do believe it is life-saving and it’s the case for so many people,” the actor told Oprah Winfrey on her new show for Apple TV+...

Page said the surgery has given him newfound energy “because it is such a freeing, freeing experience”, adding: “This is incredibly new. I feel like I haven’t gotten to be myself since I was 10 years old.”

 In the interview, Elliot speaks of feeling a discomfort with his own body that was only partly relieved by coming out as a gay woman (and entering a same sex marriage from which he has divorced); and how his (partial) transitioning enables him to now feel comfortable with his body. He goes on to challenge steps being taken in the United States in response to concerns about the treatment of children for gender reassignment, that he sees as limiting access to important health care. (There is some echo in those steps of concerns raised here in the UK about the work of the Gender Identity Development Service at the Tavistock Clinic.)

Whilst it is important to treat Elliot Page's account of his own experience with respect - it is a courtesy, I think, to refer to him now as he would wish to be referred, and hence my use of "Elliot" and masculine pronouns in this post - it does nevertheless raise two questions in the context of a wider debate.

Firstly, a narrative such as Elliot Page's should not be seen as the only and normative narrative. Alongside those suffering from gender dysphoria who may be helped by transitioning, there are also young people who may not be helped by considering transitioning, and who simply need health care as they grow up through puberty in the sex that they already have. Our public conversation needs to recognise that there are differing background stories - multiple narratives - around gender dsyphoria, and that an assumption in favour of transitioning is not always going to be helpful. The public acceptance of transitioning by the media and wider culture, which in effect promotes this acceptance to others, is not going to be helpful for everyone.

Elliot Page's earlier experience as Ellen Page in the film Juno also highlights a second question in a very visible way. He has transitioned (at least partly) from the female sex to the male sex; he is now someone who was of the female sex but is now of the male sex. How far can someone identify fully with their new physiological sex, or, as is implied by the identification as part of a "trans" community, is the fundamental identification that of a person who was of one sex and is now of the other, that of a person who has changed sex?

[In December 2020, I posted indirectly on this last point, in the context of the alacrity of media sources such as Wikipedia in changing the previous "Ellen Page" in their cast list for the film Juno to "Elliot Page": Ellen or Elliot?]

Pope Francis address to the Diplomatic Corps: two points

 Pope Francis' address during his delayed annual encounter with the diplomatic representatives accredited to the Holy See is lengthy and wide ranging. A full text can be found at the website of the Holy See: Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See. The address, at various points, demonstrates an interest and familiarity of the Holy See with a wide range of international situations.

The implications of the coronavirus pandemic for healthcare is addressed at an early point in Pope Francis' address:

The pandemic forced us to confront two unavoidable dimensions of human existence: sickness and death. In doing so, it reminded us of the value of life, of every individual human life and its dignity, at every moment of its earthly pilgrimage, from conception in the womb until its natural end. It is painful, however, to note that under the pretext of guaranteeing presumed subjective rights, a growing number of legal systems in our world seem to be moving away from their inalienable duty to protect human life at every one of its phases.

The pandemic has also reminded us of the right – the right! – of each human being to dignified care... I thus renew my appeal that every person receive the care and assistance he or she requires. To this end, it is indispensable that political and government leaders work above all to ensure universal access to basic healthcare, the creation of local medical clinics and healthcare structures that meet people’s actual needs, and the availability of treatments and medicinal supplies. Concern for profit should not be guiding a field as sensitive as that of healthcare.

If one reads this in an exclusively American context, one might see push back against President Biden's measures in favour of access to abortion (note Pope Francis' not insignificant reference to "the pretext of guaranteeing presumed subjective rights"), and a cautious support of President Biden's moves on affordable health care in the United states (qualified by the preceding remarks on the value of human life from conception to its natural end). As addressed to other parts of the world represented by the diplomats in his audience, the implications will differ.

[See here for a summary of President Biden's intentions in these regards.]

Later in his address, Pope Francis refers to the impact of measures to control the coronavirus pandemic on religious freedom:

The need to halt the spread of the virus has also had implications for a number of fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom, restricting public worship and the educational and charitable activities of faith communities. It must be recognized, however, that religion is a fundamental aspect of the human person and of society, and cannot be eliminated. Even as we seek ways to protect human lives from the spread of the virus, we cannot view the spiritual and moral dimension of the human person as less important than physical health.

Freedom of worship, furthermore, is not a corollary of the freedom of assembly. It is in essence derived from the right to freedom of religion, which is the primary and fundamental human right. This right must therefore be respected, protected and defended by civil authorities, like the right to bodily and physical health. For that matter, sound care of the body can never ignore care of the soul.

 Whilst measures that limit public gatherings can be seen as qualifying the right of assembly in favour of the general welfare in limiting the spread of the coronavirus, measures taken have at times banned public religious worship as if it comes under the same title as the right to freedom of assembly. Pope Francis points out that it is, in fact, a distinct right from that of freedom of assembly, and is deserving of protection in a way that differs from the protection due to the right of assembly. 

[Article 29 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains the provision that allows for limitations on the rights contained therein in order to meet the "just requirements of the general welfare in a democratic society".]

Ellen or Elliot?

 Some 12 years ago I saw a film Juno, and commented on it: Film Review: Juno and here.  As I observed at the time, as well as its humour, the film shows how an unplanned pregnancy can be viewed in a positive way and explores how all those involved - the parents, the boyfriend and school friends - respond to the situation. If I recall correctly, it includes a scene where Juno leaves an abortion clinic, in effect making the decision to continue her pregnancy. Wikipedia gives a fuller account of the film here.

The title role of Juno was played by Ellen Page, who has now "come out as 'trans'". It is sad to see just how quickly sources such as Wikipedia, for example, are willing to change the casting in their post about the film from "Ellen" to "Elliot". Because the role of Juno in the film is not just a female role; because of the nature of the film's plot, it is an essentially feminine role, too. 

Whilst there is a courtesy in addressing someone now in the way in which they ask to be addressed, without that implying anything other than courtesy towards the person, it will be unfortunate if a retrospective "re-gendering" should in any way overshadow the essentially female casting of a film that pre-dates transition. Whilst I might greet him now as Elliot, in Juno she remains Ellen Page.

Abortion and Disability

 While Poland experiences street protests against a judicial determination that abortion on the grounds of disability of the unborn baby is unconstitutional, the BBC has carried a report of the experiences of mothers of Down's Syndrome children. The headings of the three testimonies in the report are:

'The support was only there if I chose an abortion'

'At 38 weeks, I was told I could still terminate'

'I started to ask myself what is so wrong with him having Down's Syndrome'

The last testimony is, in some respects, the most challenging but at the same time the most instructive:

When Tom was born, Nicola was euphoric. But the following day, a paediatrician asked her if she thought he looked normal.

Tom was diagnosed with Down's syndrome and Nicola's world fell apart.

"I was offered absolutely no support to rebuild it," she says. "I felt complete and utter despair and devastation. Gone was this gorgeous baby and instead he was replaced with this unknown entity." .....

..... Nicola's maternal bond had been "severed" and it took her more than a year to fall back in love with her son.

"I started to ask myself, 'what is so wrong with him having Down's syndrome?'"

Tom, now 16, is a pupil in mainstream education. Nicola describes him as "charming, witty and charismatic". A West Bromwich Albion fan, he also enjoys golf, snorkelling and kayaking and hopes to get a job and get married.

Nicola says cancelling the amniocentesis was the best decision she ever made.

"I am terrified I would have terminated Tom's life. I was led to believe he would have a negative impact on our lives but he has enriched them and we are without doubt better people for having him in them."

The BBC report demonstrates clearly a presumption on the part of health care professionals to encourage mothers to consider abortion where there is risk of a baby having Down's Syndrome. It is difficult to read the BBC report without actually feeling that that encouragement is close to, if not in fact, undue pressure. The BBC report links to the page on the NHS website page - here - that offers advice for women with regard to the outcome of pre-natal screening tests. It would be interesting to know how much, in the light of the advice on this page, the experience of mothers has changed compared to the testimonies in this report (the advice has been changed as a result of campaigning by Nicola).

The BBC report prompts two thoughts:

Is an abortion a truly acceptable option in the case of a disability that still leaves the new born baby with a life expectancy of between 50 and 60 years (according to the BBC report), and where, during their lifetime, they can be expected to contribute much to the lives of those around them?

The fact that such an abortion is legal in the UK means that every woman who is expecting a child who may be disabled is put in the position of having to make a decision for or against that abortion. Is the challenge/difficulty, or even the degree of trauma, involved in that decision really in the best interests of every woman, particularly given the apparent presumption in one direction of the surrounding medical care? Is this a choice that women should really be asked to make?

Life: A Mystery

 ... is the title of a session at the 2020 annual Rimini Meeting organised under the auspices of Communion and Liberation. The link to the video of the session is here: Life: A Mystery. The first and third presentations are in English; the second presentation is a simultaneous English translation from Italian (there may be one or two infelicitous translations, where an English phrase may not fully reflect the Italian original). Total length is just over an hour.

The first presentation gives a survey of the experience of euthanasia in the Netherlands by Theo Boer, an ethicist who had originally supported legislation in favour of euthanasia but subsequently resigned from one of the regional oversight committees that exist in the Netherlands. The second is given by the doctor responsible for leading on the intensive care provision in Lombardy province during the COVID-19 emergency earlier this year. He describes his experience during that time. The third presentation is from Elvira Parravicini, describing her work in Neo-natal Comfort Care. She ends her talk with a very moving account of one of her cases. 

I think the video is worth watching, not just because of its content, but also because of the encounter it engenders with the presenters, and the sense it gives of how they have responded to the challenges of their professional lives.

On the inadmissability of the death penalty ...

In the light of Pope Francis' promulgation of new wording for n.2267 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (though it is worth reading the preceding n.2266 as well for a complete context), I have searched "death penalty" on this blog.

It produced these two earlier posts: The consensus of the Holy Fathers ..... and The end of Traditionalism?

Je suis Stefano, je suis Domenico (UPDATED - AGAIN)

Messrs Dolce and Gabbano are taking some criticism from the great and good over the content of an interview given to the Italian magazine Panorama. In publishing the text of the interview online (sorry, no time to translate), Panorama observes that much of the (international) controversy has arisen as a result of Elton John's intervention rather than from a reading of the text of the interview itself. Unfortunately, the words that provoked the ire of the great and good occur early in the interview thus losing a certain context that is gained by reading the rest of the interview.

The first context is a project of Dolce and Gabbano to gather images of families from all over the world: #DGfamily, with its strapline "The family is our point of reference". The #DGfamily archive is also the subject of a study at the Centre for Fashion and Cultural Production at the Catholic University of Milan. There is also a context in their recent presentation of their collection at Milan Fashion Week.

The recognition that it is not possible/appropriate that a relationship such as their own should be seen as a marriage or a family, or that it should issue in children, represent an interesting contribution to contemporary discussion on the family. The Panorama interview, seen as a whole, offers a fascinating reflection on the question of the family, from the point of view of two gay men (at one time in a relationship but now just professional colleagues) and from  the point of view of  their own experiences of lives lived in families. The interview offers an argument for a permanence in value of the "traditional family" - they do not believe there is any family other than that. Clearly Elton John - with two children conceived through IVF and carried by a surrogate mother - has a stake in trying to silence this point of view.

Which is why the most fundamental thing to be said in the context of the controversy following Elton John's intervention is said at the beginning of further coverage at Panorama online:

"Dolce e Gabbana sono liberi di esprimersi sulla famiglia e sui figli, nessuno ha diritto di censurarli, come hanno preteso di fare Elton John e altri"... [Dolce and Gabbana are free to express themselves on the family and on children, no-one has the right to censor them, as Elton John and others have tried to do...]

Or, as the title of this post says:

Je suis Stefano, je suis Domenico 

The Catholic theologian commenting in Panorama does not accept the description of IVF conceived children as "children of a chemistry" or "synthetic children" given by Domenico Dolce in the interview, wishing instead to refer to them as children who "remain human individuals ... who have a dignity and value as such". However, he insists that it is possible to remain critical of the means used to conceive such a child whilst still respecting and recognising them fully as human persons. Mgr Cozzoli goes on to offer a very capable exposition of a Catholic position for a general audience.

The whole original interview is worth reading, but I offer a flavour here. Domenico Dolce's reply to the question "Would you like to have been parents?":

Sono gay, non posso avere un figlio. Credo che non si possa avere tutto dalla vita, se non c’è vuol dire che non ci deve essere. È anche bello privarsi di qualcosa. La vita ha un suo percorso naturale, ci sono cose che non vanno modificate. E una di queste è la famiglia. [I am gay, I cannot have a child. I believe that it is not possible to have everything in life, if it is not possible one can say that it must not be. And it is also beautiful to deny oneself something. Life has a natural course, there are things that cannot be changed. And one of these is the family.] 

This article offers more comment on the Dolce and Gabbana vs. Elton John controversy, and usefully summarises the substance of the interview as follows:

The sexual complementarity of parents, the indispensability of the mother and father, and the centrality of love in procreative relationships, are serious issues, and Gabbana’s praise of the ‘supernatural sense of belonging’ in family life strike me as a charismatic endorsement of the family.

UPDATED: Thinking Faith has a post here that comments on the Elton John/Dolce and Gabbana flare up in terms of the nature of the internet and how St Ignatius might suggest we use that medium: #BoycottOnlineAnger: Elton John and Dolce & Gabbana . I quote from this post:

...St Ignatius’s advice to spiritual directors in the famous Paragraph 22 of the Spiritual Exercises, which says the following:

“To assure better cooperation between the one who is giving the Exercises and the exercitant, and more beneficial results for both, it is necessary to suppose that every good Christian is more ready to put a good interpretation on another’s statement than to condemn it as false.”

This is often referred to as the ‘Presupposition’, and it has a wider application than the Exercises: is a foundation stone for all civil communication. 

Whilst I have not followed events fully, it is apparent that Domenico Dolce and Stefano Gabbana have received more support for the position on marriage articulated in their interview than one might have expected.

UPDATED - AGAIN: see also this blog post at the Tablet website: Children raised by gay parents thank Dolce and Gabbana.

Is it true that Vatican II issued no condemnations?

In the most obvious sense of the question, it is true that the Council documents contain no condemnations. That is, the Council documents do not include at the end a list of opinions contrary to the exposition contained in the documents themselves, listed as being condemned, and attracting that wonderful descriptor, anathema sit. In particular, a wording that condemns the persons who might hold these contrary opinions is absent.

It is correct, I think, to see in this something of significance for the nature the Second Vatican Council and for the nature of one of the attitudes that it sought to encourage. It is a sign of a positive engagement between the Church and the wider world, a positive engagement with the culture of our times. But, and I think the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes demonstrates this particularly, it is a critical engagement and not a compliant one. So the Council sought a positive and intelligent engagement with the world.

But is it true to say that condemnations are absent from the expositions of the Council documents themselves? They are certainly few and far between, but when the assertion that the Council issued no condemnations was aired at last evening's Tablet lecture, three examples immediately ran through my mind.

From Sacrosanctum Concilium n.22:

... no other person, even if he be a priest, may add, remove, or change anything in the liturgy on his own authority.

OK, this is not in the form of a condemnation. But it does clearly indicate a manner of behaviour that is not supported by the Council document concerned.

From Gaudium et Spes n.80:

... this most holy synod makes its own the condemnations of total war already pronounced by recent popes, and issues the following declaration.

Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.

Condemnations do not come much clearer than that! And n.81 contains a condemnation of the arms trade. Though the Vatican website appears somewhat clumsy in its translation - my print copy refers to "greatest curse" rather than "treacherous trap" - it does communicate some force.

Therefore, we say it again: the arms race is an utterly treacherous trap for humanity, and one which ensnares the poor to an intolerable degree.

 And from Gaudium et Spes n.51:

Therefore from the moment of its conception life must be guarded with the greatest care while abortion and infanticide are unspeakable crimes.

The Paralympic Games must change the way we think about abortion

The Paralympic Games must change the way we think about abortion.

... if, as Lord Coe says, 'we will never think of disability the same way', surely we must lift 'the cloud of limitation' on the thousands of unborn babies in the womb, whom providence has seen fit to gift with one leg, no arms, no eyes, dwarfism or spina bifida.

 'Paralympics call Britain to review abortion laws'

“What is astounding is that Britain is enabling the eyes of the world to be opened to the giftedness and potential of those with disabilities through its hosting of the Paralympic Games. However, its own laws vehemently and shockingly discriminate against any new life in the womb that might possibly be affected by a physical handicap, genetic problems or a mental defect."

In conversations with a number of Paralympians in recent days [James Parker, Catholic co-ordinator for the 2012 Games] was astonished to discover that “many of them don’t even realise that, should their team mates have been conceived in Britain today, they would most likely be aborted. If Britain wishes to retain its place towards the head of the medals table at future Paralympic Games in decades to come then it needs to seriously consider changing its laws to stop discriminating against what is presently termed as an ‘unacceptable quality of life’. Games aside, any society that wishes to be healthy needs to increasingly value disability and non-disability equally.

h/t Archbishop Cranmer and Independent Catholic News

"Right to die": an invented right

 The news media are today reporting that a health minister newly promoted in the recent Cabinet/Government reshuffle has said, in the context of terminally ill people, that "you have a right to kill yourself". It is interesting to note the different emphases of the BBC reporting and that in the Telegraph. The front page report, and published interview on inside pages, in the Times are behind their paywall, so I am not able to link to them. The penultimate paragraph of the interview in the print edition reads as follows:

Ms Soubry has always been a "firm supporter" of the Abortion Act and backs the introduction of gay marriage. She also thinks there is a case for reforming the law on assisted suicide. "I think it's ridiculous and appalling that people have to go abroad to end their life instead of being able to end their life at home. You can't say to a doctor or a nurse, 'Kill this person' but ... you have a right to kill yourself. The rules that we have about who we don't prosecute allow things to happen but there's a good argument that we should be a bit more honest about it".

Though it is not clear what Ms Soubry thinks the terms of a reformed law should be, I would challenge her to justify the claim that there is such a thing as a right to kill to yourself. When asserted in the public domain, it sounds eminently reasonable and compassionate. But does it have a rational, argued basis, rooted in the nature of the human person?

No justification whatsoever can be found for the assertion of a right to kill yourself in a document such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If anything, the provisions of the Universal Declaration suggest the opposite (my emphasis added):

Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 25: (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

Can it not be argued, contrary to Anna Soubry, that a situation where a terminally ill person feels that they want to kill themselves represents a breach of their rights under the above articles of the Universal Declaration? And that the establishing, even within the limited context of the terminally ill patient, of such a right within UK law would bring UK law into conflict with the Universal Declaration?

I find Anna Soubry's intervention particularly unfortunate in such close proximity to the example provided by the London 2012 Paralympics of how hope is engendered, not just by the person who is ill or disabled alone, or by the person who is caring alone, but between the two together. See my posts At the Paralympics and Paralympics Chaplain on Radio 2. It is sad to see such a prominent intervention that fails to recognise the part that society as a whole has to play in working to engender this community of hope rather than undermining it.

Publishing the Pictures: in the public interest

The Sun (a newspaper I do not read) has done it: Prince Harry naked Vegas photos published by Sun. I must admit that arguing that the publication of the photographs represents a key issue in terms of the freedom of the press seems to me somewhat thin.

I do think there is a public interest in the publication of the photographs, though.

And it lies in the question that, to a large extent, is remaining unasked or being suppressed by the media.

According to the BBC report:

The Sun said in a statement that in publishing the photos it was not making any moral judgement about the prince's activities.

It said: "He often sails close to the wind for a royal - but he's 27, single and a soldier.

The unasked question is of course precisely the moral question that the Sun is disregarding.

Is it morally right for anyone - be they third in line to the throne, be they 27 years old, be they single or be they a soldier, or just any one of these - to be cavorting naked with others in their hotel room?

And it is interesting that, in so far as the BBC reporting does cover this aspect, the question being asked is not one about whether or not the behaviour is moral, but whether or not it is normal: Harry photos: Is it normal to drink and end up naked?

Love and Death

Occasionally I spend time with people who are coming to the end of their lives, and try to communicate to their relatives the irreplaceable nature of that time, not just for the person who is dying, but for them as well. I don't think I do it very well.
Love and Death.