Two Popes in Kazakhstan

There is a striking comparison to be made between the visit of Pope St John Paul II to Kazakhstan in September 2001 and the more recent visit of Pope Francis in September 2022. The records of the two visits can be found at the website of the Holy See: Pastoral Visit to Kazakhstan (John Paul II) and Apostolic Journey to Kazakhstan (Pope Francis).

In his press conference during the flight home from Kazakhstan, Pope Francis said that he had found the social and cultural development of the country a surprise, that he had know little or nothing of the country before his visit. However, his main address during the visit reflected, as did the addresses of St John Paul II during his visit, a familiarity with Abai Kunanbai, perhaps the Kazakhstan's greatest thinker. And, in slightly different ways, both Pope Francis and St John Paul II focussed on the question of freedom of religion and the relationship between religious believers and the society in which they live.

In his 2001 visit, St John Paul II took part in a meeting with representatives of the world of culture. Speaking only a few years after Kazakhstan had gained its independence from the former Soviet Union, he referred to the range of influences that had given rise to a "vibrant local culture, rich in creative developments".

One of your country’s great thinkers, the teacher Abai Kunanbai, put it this way: "A man cannot be a man unless he perceives the evident and the hidden mysteries of the universe, unless he seeks an explanation for everything. Anyone who fails to do this is no different from the animals. God distinguished man from the animals by giving him a soul... It is absolutely necessary that we constantly extend our interests, increasing the knowledge which nourishes our souls. It is important to realize that the goods of the soul are incomparably superior to the benefits of the body, and that carnal needs should be subordinated to the imperatives of the soul" (Sayings of Abai, Chapter 7)....

 St John Paul went on to identify the religious character of such questions, and to give an account of how the Christian believer, whilst convinced that Jesus Christ represents the answer to these questions, bears witness "in full respect for the search which other people of good will are engaged in along different paths":

Questions like this are religious by their very nature, in the sense that they appeal to those supreme values which have God as their ultimate foundation. Religion, for its part, cannot fail to grapple with these existential questions; otherwise it loses contact with life.

Christians know that in Jesus of Nazareth, called the Christ, a complete answer has been given to the questions dwelling deep in the human heart. Jesus’ words, his actions and, in the end, his Paschal Mystery, have revealed him to be the Redeemer of man and the Saviour of the world. Of this "good news", which for two thousand years has been on the lips of countless men and women in every part of the earth, the Pope of Rome comes before you today as a humble and convinced witness, in full respect for the search which other people of good will are engaged in along different paths. Whoever has encountered the truth in all the splendour of its beauty must necessarily feel drawn to share it with others. Rather than an obligation based on a law, the believer feels the need to share with others the supreme Value of his own life.

St John Paul II goes on to draw the conclusion for the right to religious freedom in the secular state:

Consequently – even in the context of a soundly secular State, which is obliged in any event to guarantee to each citizen, without distinction of sex, race and nationality, the fundamental right to freedom of conscience – there is a need to acknowledge and defend the right of believers to bear public witness to their faith. Authentic religious practice cannot be reduced to the private sphere or narrowly restricted to the edges of society. The beauty of the new houses of worship which are beginning to rise up almost everywhere in the new Kazakhstan is a precious sign of spiritual rebirth and a sign of promise for the future.

The centre piece of Pope Francis' visit in 2022 was his speech at the opening of the VII Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions. In a passage that has echoes of St John Paul II's earlier visit, Pope Francis urged that "Religion is not a problem, but part of the solution for a more harmonious life in society":

Abai challenges us by asking a timeless question: “What is the beauty of life, if one does not go deep?” (Poems, 1898). Another poet, pondering the meaning of life, placed on the lips of a shepherd in these vast lands of Asia an equally essential question: “Where will this, my brief wandering, lead?” (G. LEOPARDI, Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia). Questions like these point to humanity’s need for religion; they remind us that we human beings do not exist so much to satisfy earthly interests or to weave purely economic relationships, as to walk together, as wayfarers, with our eyes raised to the heavens. We need to make sense of the ultimate questions, to cultivate a spirituality; we need, as Abai says, to keep “the soul alive and the mind clear” (Book of Words, Word 6).

Dear brothers and sisters, the world expects us to be examples of souls alive and minds clear; it looks to us for an authentic religiosity. It is time to realize that the fundamentalism defiles and corrupts every creed; time for open and compassionate hearts. It is also time to consign to the history books the kind of talk that for all too long, here and elsewhere, has led to distrust and contempt for religion, as if it were a destabilizing force in modern society. These lands are all too familiar with the legacy of decades of state-imposed atheism: that oppressive and stifling mentality for which the mere mention of the word “religion” was greeted with embarrassed silence. Religion is not a problem, but part of the solution for a more harmonious life in society. The pursuit of transcendence and the sacred value of fraternity can inspire and illumine the decisions that need to be made amid the geopolitical, social, economic, ecological, but fundamentally spiritual crises that many modern institutions, including democracies, are presently experiencing, to the detriment of security and concord among peoples. We need religion, in order to respond to the thirst for world peace and the thirst for the infinite that dwells in the heart of each man and woman.

And like St John Paul II before him, Pope Francis goes on to insist on the necessity of religious freedom, though now with a reference to inter-religious dialogue: "Each person has the right to render public testimony to his or her own creed, proposing it without ever imposing it".

For this reason, an essential condition for genuinely human and integral development is religious freedom. Brothers and sisters, we are free. Our Creator “stepped aside for us”; in a manner of speaking, he “limited” his absolute freedom in order to enable us, his creatures, to be free. How can we then presume to coerce our brothers and sisters in his name? “As believers and worshipers”, Abai once again tells us, “we must not claim that we can force others to believe and worship” (Word 45). Religious freedom is a basic, primary and inalienable right needing to be promoted everywhere, one that may not be restricted merely to freedom of worship. Each person has the right to render public testimony to his or her own creed, proposing it without ever imposing it. This is the correct method of preaching, as opposed to proselytism and indoctrination, from which all are called to step back. To relegate to the private sphere our most important beliefs in life would be to deprive society of an immense treasure. On the other hand, to work for a society marked by the respectful coexistence of religious, ethnic and cultural differences is the best way to enhance the distinctive features of each, to bring people together while respecting their diversity, and to promote their loftiest aspirations without compromising their vitality. 

A post at the blog Where Peter is draws attention to four challenges to religions that Pope Francis describes in his address: Pope Francis' message to world religious leaders. H/T to this post for drawing my attention to Pope Francis' visit to Kazakhstan.

From two different angles, one from the point of view of culture and society and the other from the point of view of dialogue between religions and society, St John Paul II and Pope Francis arrive at the same understanding of the importance of religious freedom for the life of (secular) societies.

It is also worth noting the high regard given by both St John Paul II and Pope Francis to the present day situation of Kazakhstan and to its rich cultural history, in part a result of a geographical location which has prompted a particular experience of encounter with different influences at different times.

Freedom of Religion or Belief - and abortion

 At the beginning of July the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the UK Government hosted an international ministerial meeting on "Freedom of Religion or Belief". My attention was first drawn to this meeting by Mgr Michael Nazir Ali's article in the September/October issue of FAITH Magazine: Is Freedom of Religion or Belief now politically mainstream? My attention was drawn again by the BBC's reporting of the reaction of an abortion provider to the appointment of Therese Coffey as Secretary of State for Health and, indeed, to Liz Truss's appointment as prime minister: Therese Coffey's views on abortion concerning, charity says. 

Mgr Nazir Ali's article makes reference to "fringe" events that took place on the sidelines of the main conference, addressing violations of freedom of religion and belief in different situations around the world. Aid to the Church in Need ran one of these "fringe" events, discussing the persecution of Christians in Syria and Iraq: Christian persecution never ended in the Middle East. This page indicates the activities of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief at the time of the ministerial meeting.

However, though Mgr Nazir Ali does not mention it, there also appears to be an assimilation of an idea of "conscientious choice for abortion" into the notion of freedom of belief, as evidenced by what the executive director of Humanists UK said during the opening ceremony of the main conference:

“If FoRB is to be for everyone everywhere, we must all resist the temptation to impose our beliefs on others. This is how so many violations of FoRB originate. That is true of the Christian in China whose atheist government prevents her from congregating freely as her conscience leads her and of the non-religious woman in the West when Christians in her Government block her conscientious choice of an abortion or any other practice. Illiberal totalitarianism, whether atheist, Christian, Islamic: many forces limit freedom of religion or belief today. All of us are in the minority somewhere and all of us have brothers and sisters subject somewhere to the vilest of persecution.”

 The main conference resulted in number of statements that participating nations were invited to sign up to. The statement that has brought particular attention to Liz Truss, who at the time of the conference was the UK Foreign Secretary, is the one about freedom of religion or belief and gender equality. The "final" version that now appears on the FCDO website is here: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Gender Equality. However, the first bullet point of the original version (my italics added) indicated a commitment to:

uphold and protect gender equality, non-discrimination and freedom of religion or belief. Discriminatory personal status laws, laws that allow harmful practices, or restrict women’s and girls’ full and equal enjoyment of all human rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, bodily autonomy, and other laws that justify, condone, or reinforce violence, discrimination, or inequalities on the grounds of religion, belief or gender should be repealed.

That bullet point now reads:

uphold and protect gender equality, non-discrimination and freedom of religion or belief. Challenge discriminatory laws that justify, condone, or reinforce violence, discrimination, or inequalities on the grounds of religion, belief or gender and that restrict women and girls’ full and equal enjoyment of human right.

 The change appears to have been made after the conclusion of the conference, and Liz Truss has defended it in parliament on the grounds that it allows a greater degree of unity among conference participants.

But once again, what is to be seen here is an advocacy in favour of abortion based in a consideration that does not reference the ethical rights or wrongs of abortion but a contrived assimilation of a rather distinct consideration. In the case of America's Roe vs. Wade judgement it was a consideration of privacy as expressed in the US constitution; in the case of the extension of legalised abortion to Northern Ireland it was a consideration of whether or not travel to access abortion was degrading treatment; and now it is a contrived inclusion of gender as a consideration in freedom of religion or belief. 

Whilst Christians should certainly advocate for the freedom of others with regards to their differing religion or belief, in a way that is absolute and universal, there is a need to resist the absorption into that universality advocacy for falsely contrived rights that do not exist as rights properly so called.

Numbers

 I was in central London yesterday, Good Friday, for the passion play in Trafalgar Square and for the 3pm liturgy. Extinction Rebellion were evident at Trafalgar Square and, credit to them, as they walked round the outside of the square at one point during the 12 noon performance of the passion play, they did so in silence and without beating their drums. They did get media attention, and prompted the deployment of the police helicopter with its attendant use of fossil fuels, though the headline on the Evening Standard website strikes me as a great exaggeration compared to the experience of many in London yesterday: XR did not bring London to a standstill.

So far as I could judge, the numbers who participated in the two performances of the Wintershall passion play will have far exceeded those taking part in XR protests yesterday. We can add to that the number of people who will have attended the 3pm liturgy in central London churches yesterday, or taken part in processions or other services to mark Good Friday. 

Which of these events is really the most worthy of news coverage?

Canon Michael Bourdeaux

 The Times newspaper today carries an obituary of Canon Bourdeaux, who died on 29th March 2021.  (The Guardian obituary can be read here; and an appreciation from the Keston Institute here.)

The obituary in the Times refers to Canon Bourdeaux's influence with political leaders, based on the integrity of the research work of Keston College:

In Britain Bourdeaux was consulted in the 1970s by Harold Wilson, and in 1983 after he had briefed Thatcher she took a personal interest in securing the release of Irina Ratushinskaya, a Christian poet, and Alexander Ogorodnikov, the founder of a Christian seminar in Moscow.

At that time, Keston College had a network of support groups in the UK, including one based in Hornchurch. Each group was assigned a particular religious believer experiencing persecution behind the iron curtain in order to pray for them and support them by, for example, sending supporting cards to their prison addresses. Irina Ratushinskaya was the prisoner assigned to the Hornchurch support group. I still have in my possession the minute book of the Hornchurch support group, as I was secretary for a number of years. If I recall correctly, I became a member of the support group after visiting an open day at Keston College, in the days when it was based in the former village school at Keston.

The minutes of the group Annual General Meeting in October 1986 record a collection of £120 being taken at the meeting, and handed to a representative of Keston College so that it could be spent to buy orthopaedic boots and a warm coat for Irina Ratushinskaya, who at that time had just been released from prison and was seriously ill following her ill-treatment in prison.

Irina visited the Hornchurch support group in September 1988. My minutes of that meeting read as follows:

Over eighty members and friends of the Group put questins to Irina Ratushinskaya. Irina first answered questions about her time at school in the Soviet Union, and then answered questions from the floor. Irina was accompanied by her husband Igor, and Mrs Alyona Kojevnikov from Keston College.... Irina's closing remarks were to thank members of the Group for providing the money for a pair of boots. After the meeting, refreshments were served, and Irina signed copies of her books.

 Very different times .... 

Pope Francis address to the Diplomatic Corps: two points

 Pope Francis' address during his delayed annual encounter with the diplomatic representatives accredited to the Holy See is lengthy and wide ranging. A full text can be found at the website of the Holy See: Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See. The address, at various points, demonstrates an interest and familiarity of the Holy See with a wide range of international situations.

The implications of the coronavirus pandemic for healthcare is addressed at an early point in Pope Francis' address:

The pandemic forced us to confront two unavoidable dimensions of human existence: sickness and death. In doing so, it reminded us of the value of life, of every individual human life and its dignity, at every moment of its earthly pilgrimage, from conception in the womb until its natural end. It is painful, however, to note that under the pretext of guaranteeing presumed subjective rights, a growing number of legal systems in our world seem to be moving away from their inalienable duty to protect human life at every one of its phases.

The pandemic has also reminded us of the right – the right! – of each human being to dignified care... I thus renew my appeal that every person receive the care and assistance he or she requires. To this end, it is indispensable that political and government leaders work above all to ensure universal access to basic healthcare, the creation of local medical clinics and healthcare structures that meet people’s actual needs, and the availability of treatments and medicinal supplies. Concern for profit should not be guiding a field as sensitive as that of healthcare.

If one reads this in an exclusively American context, one might see push back against President Biden's measures in favour of access to abortion (note Pope Francis' not insignificant reference to "the pretext of guaranteeing presumed subjective rights"), and a cautious support of President Biden's moves on affordable health care in the United states (qualified by the preceding remarks on the value of human life from conception to its natural end). As addressed to other parts of the world represented by the diplomats in his audience, the implications will differ.

[See here for a summary of President Biden's intentions in these regards.]

Later in his address, Pope Francis refers to the impact of measures to control the coronavirus pandemic on religious freedom:

The need to halt the spread of the virus has also had implications for a number of fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom, restricting public worship and the educational and charitable activities of faith communities. It must be recognized, however, that religion is a fundamental aspect of the human person and of society, and cannot be eliminated. Even as we seek ways to protect human lives from the spread of the virus, we cannot view the spiritual and moral dimension of the human person as less important than physical health.

Freedom of worship, furthermore, is not a corollary of the freedom of assembly. It is in essence derived from the right to freedom of religion, which is the primary and fundamental human right. This right must therefore be respected, protected and defended by civil authorities, like the right to bodily and physical health. For that matter, sound care of the body can never ignore care of the soul.

 Whilst measures that limit public gatherings can be seen as qualifying the right of assembly in favour of the general welfare in limiting the spread of the coronavirus, measures taken have at times banned public religious worship as if it comes under the same title as the right to freedom of assembly. Pope Francis points out that it is, in fact, a distinct right from that of freedom of assembly, and is deserving of protection in a way that differs from the protection due to the right of assembly. 

[Article 29 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains the provision that allows for limitations on the rights contained therein in order to meet the "just requirements of the general welfare in a democratic society".]

The Holy See and the United Nations: Paul VI

 In October 1965, during the meeting of the Second Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI paid a visit to the United Nations. The then Secretary General of the United Nations had invited the Holy Father to speak to the General Assembly in marking the twentieth anniversary of the organisation. Paul VI himself described this visit as a moment "bearing the imprint of a unique greatness", both for himself and for the United Nations. The full English text of Pope Paul's address can be found here at the Vatican website; the United Nations website carries a radio report, in English, of his visit here, a report that conveys something of the high expectations surrounding Pope Paul's visit. The address was originally delivered in French: text at the Vatican website here and audio on the United Nations site here. 

Pope Paul's speech is memorable for its impassioned plea for peace:

Here our message reaches its culmination and we will speak first of all negatively. These are the words you are looking for us to say and the words we cannot utter without feeling aware of their seriousness and solemnity: never again one against the other, never, never again!

Was not this the very end for which the United Nations came into existence: to be against war and for peace? Listen to the clear words of a great man who is no longer with us, John Kennedy, who proclaimed four years ago: "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind." There is no need for a long talk to proclaim the main purpose of your Institution. It is enough to recall that the blood of millions, countless unheard-of sufferings, useless massacres and frightening ruins have sanctioned the agreement that unites you with an oath that ought to change the future history of the world: never again war, never again war! It is peace, peace, that has to guide the destiny of the nations of all mankind!

 But what I would like to explore is those sections of Pope Paul's address which indicate how he, and in his person the Holy See, understood the nature of the organisation that is the United Nations. 

You offer the many States which can no longer ignore each other a form of coexistence that is extremely simple and fruitful. First of all, you recognize them and distinguish them from each other. Now you certainly do not confer existence on States, but you do qualify each nation as worthy of being seated in the orderly assembly of peoples. You confer recognition of lofty moral and juridical value upon each sovereign national community and you guarantee it an honorable international citizenship.

There are two components in this paragraph. The first is a recognition that each of the individual states is not able to ignore the others; the behaviours of any one state have an influence on the behaviours of other states. And then secondly, in this context, the UN is recognises for each national community a "moral and juridical value" in a relationship to the like value of every other state, what the speech terms "international citizenship". Each national community is recognised as being of account in the consideration of every other national community. "Your vocation is to bring not just some peoples but all peoples together as brothers", to use the words Pope Paul used later in his address. This same paragraph ends with the following sentence which, though it does not require further exposition, is nevertheless significant for its implications for what should govern the relations between states:

You [ie the UN] sanction the great principle that relationships between nations must be regulated by reason, justice, law and negotiation, and not by force, violence, war, nor indeed by fear and deceit.

Pope Paul identifies a mission of working for peace as being characteristic of the nature of the United Nations:

Gentlemen, you have accomplished and are now in the course of accomplishing a great work: you are teaching men peace. The United Nations is the great school where people get this education and we are here in the assembly hall of this school. Anyone who takes his place here becomes a pupil and a teacher in the art of building peace. And when you go outside of this room, the world looks to you as the architects and builders of peace.

As you know very well, peace is not built merely by means of politics and a balance of power and interests. It is built with the mind, with ideas, with the works of peace. You are working at this great endeavor, but you are only at the beginning of your labors.

We do now have many more years experience of the work of the United Nations than were available to Pope Paul in 1965, an experience during which the deliberations of the UN Security Council in particular have not infrequently been the scene of exactly the politics of power and individual interests (think, for example, of the lack of action with regard to Syria since the civil war broke out there) to which Pope Paul drew attention. Reading Pope Paul's words today makes us feel that those words need to be repeated again to recall the members of the United Nations to their essential vocation.

To speak of humaneness and generosity is to echo another constitutional principle of the United Nations, its positive summit: you are working here not just to eliminate conflicts between States, but to make it possible for States to work for each other. You are not content with facilitating coexistence between nations. You are taking a much bigger step forward, one worthy of our praise and our support: you are organizing fraternal collaboration between nations..... This is the finest aspect of the United Nations Organization, its very genuine human side....

What you are proclaiming here are the basic rights and duties of man, his dignity, his liberty and above all his religious liberty. We feel that you are spokesmen for what is loftiest in human wisdom - we might almost say its sacred character - for it is above all a question of human life, and human life is sacred; no one can dare attack it.

We do not need to say anything further on this dimension of the work of the United Nations as identified by Pope Paul, beyond perhaps suggesting that Pope Paul is identifying an idea of international fraternity in its work that would later become the subject of Pope Francis' encyclical Fratelli Tutti.

Whilst these passages indicate something of how Pope Paul understood the nature and mission of the United Nations, an earlier part of his address offers what might rather be seen as a prudential judgement of the UN as being "the obligatory path of modern civilization and world peace":

Permit us to say that we have a message, and a happy one, to hand over to each one of you Our message is meant to be first of all a solemn moral ratification of this lofty Institution, and it comes from our experience of history. It is as an "expert on humanity" that we bring this Organization the support and approval of our recent predecessors, that of the Catholic hierarchy, and our own, convinced as we are that this Organization represents the obligatory path of modern civilization and world peace.

Whilst it may not be perfect - and Pope Paul recognised that the United Nations was setting out on its path rather than having achieved its purpose - this is an organisation to which support should be given.

[Postscript: it is also worth noting that Pope Paul referred, in a very diplomatic way, to some specific issues in his address - disarmament, birth control, the economic and social progress of poorer nations, literacy and culture.]

Wrong rights?

During the last couple of weeks, I have been prompted a number of times to reflect on the image of the slogan among the fruit and vegetables that appears in an early section of Vaclav Havel's (at one time at least, but now perhaps rather forgotten) well known essay "The Power of the Powerless". Follow this link, and go to section III to see the full context.

THE MANAGER of a fruit-and-vegetable shop places in his window, among the onions and carrots, the slogan: "Workers of the world, unite!" Why does he do it? What is he trying to communicate to the world? Is he genuinely enthusiastic about the idea of unity among the workers of the world? Is his enthusiasm so great that he feels an irrepressible impulse to acquaint the public with his ideals? Has he really given more than a moment's thought to how such a unification might occur and what it would mean? 

I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from the enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all into the window simply because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble. He could be reproached for not having the proper decoration in his window; someone might even accuse him of disloyalty. He does it because these things must be done if one is to get along in life. It is one of the thousands of details that guarantee him a relatively tranquil life "in harmony with society," as they say.

Aunty points out that, at the time that Vaclav Havel wrote this essay, we probably would not have thought it possible that the sentiments such as those contained in it could apply to our Western societies, adding: 

Defending marriage as the union of one man and one woman,  openly opposing the deliberate abortion of an unborn baby, affirming that sexual activity outside the marriage bond is contrary to the moral law...all these things are essential to a wholesome and humane society. We can have a debate about these things, we can recognise the need to be open and tolerant of different opinions - but we cannot survive unless we are allowed to affirm the truth of male/female marriage and the protection of pre-born children.

And the cruel attempts to silence, undermine and destroy groups and individuals who seek to uphold the moral law do point the way to martyrdom...

And, likewise, Peter Saunders offers a commentary about transgender issues. I quote one paragraph, but do read the whole:

We are starting to see real pressure being put on people to adopt a new ideology, use new language, affirm the beliefs of transgender people and participate in surgical and hormonal gender reassignment. Some lobby groups want these things to be legally enforced.

If he were to refuse, there could be trouble .....

He does it because these things must be done if one is to get along in life .....


Postcript: Vaclav Havel's commentary on the role of ideology, from the same section III of his essay, written for his particular situation but with resonances for Western societies today:

Ideology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for them to part with them. As the repository of something suprapersonal and objective, it enables people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and their inglorious modus vivendi, both from the world and from themselves. It is a very pragmatic but, at the same time, an apparently dignified way of legitimizing what is above, below, and on either side. It is directed toward people and toward God. It is a veil behind which human beings can hide their own fallen existence, their trivialization, and their adaptation to the status quo. It is an excuse that everyone can use, from the greengrocer, who conceals his fear of losing his job behind an alleged interest in the unification of the workers of the world, to the highest functionary, whose interest in staying in power can be cloaked in phrases about service to the working class. The primary excusatory function of ideology, therefore, is to provide people, both as victims and pillars of the post-totalitarian system, with the illusion that the system is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe

SSPX: a flawed proposal?

When he issued the motu proprio Summorum Pontificum, Pope Benedict XVI also wrote an accompanying letter to the bishops of the world. That letter explained the intentions behind the juridical provisions of the motu proprio itself. It is worth noting two points from the letter:

In the first place, there is the fear that the document detracts from the authority of the Second Vatican Council, one of whose essential decisions – the liturgical reform – is being called into question. Firstly, in responding to the concern that the greater provision for celebration of the Extraordinary Form would call in to question the Liturgical reforms since Vatican II:

This fear is unfounded.  In this regard, it must first be said that the Missal published by Paul VI and then republished in two subsequent editions by John Paul II, obviously is and continues to be the normal Form – the Forma ordinaria – of the Eucharistic Liturgy.  The last version of the Missale Romanum prior to the Council, which was published with the authority of Pope John XXIII in 1962 and used during the Council, will now be able to be used as a Forma extraordinaria of the liturgical celebration.  It is not appropriate to speak of these two versions of the Roman Missal as if they were “two Rites”.  Rather, it is a matter of a twofold use of one and the same rite.

And secondly, Pope Benedict clearly demonstrated an expectation that it is the Missal of Paul VI, and not that of John XXIII, that should unite parish communities:

...the two Forms of the usage of the Roman Rite can be mutually enriching: new Saints and some of the new Prefaces can and should be inserted in the old Missal.  The “Ecclesia Dei” Commission, in contact with various bodies devoted to the usus antiquior, will study the practical possibilities in this regard. The celebration of the Mass according to the Missal of Paul VI will be able to demonstrate, more powerfully than has been the case hitherto, the sacrality which attracts many people to the former usage.  The most sure guarantee that the Missal of Paul VI can unite parish communities and be loved by them consists in its being celebrated with great reverence in harmony with the liturgical directives. This will bring out the spiritual richness and the theological depth of this Missal. 

Summorum Pontificum appears to me to have had two unfortunate consequences, neither of which were intended when it was promulgated. The first, which was largely transitory, was that Catholics with no attachment to the Extraordinary Form felt that they had to "take a stance", one way or another, with regard to the Extraordinary Form, when the living of a Catholic life demanded no such thing. This has largely dissipated with the passage of time (though a train of thought among Traditionalists is perhaps bringing it to the fore again). The second has been the legitimacy given to a subsequent promotion of the Extraordinary Form, more or less over and against the Ordinary Form, within the Traditionalist movement, and from within the Traditionalist movement to the wider community of the Church. The initial "headline" back in 2007-8, and maintained today, was the continued use of the term "Traditional Latin Mass", with its inherent suggestion that, juridically speaking, the Extraordinary Form was more "traditional" than the Ordinary Form, when the letter to bishops accompanying Summorum Pontificum , in speaking of two forms of the same rite, indicates that the one form is as "traditional" as the other. This has reached its ultimate destination in the recent efforts of Dr Shaw to claim the Extraordinary Form as the (only) place to find authentic Catholicism (here), something that I do not think was at all envisaged by Benedict XVI.

In summary, the Traditionalist movement has taken Summorum Pontificum as legitimising a promotion of the Extraordinary Form in  a manner and a context that has no justification whatsoever in Summorum Pontificum and the accompanying letter to bishops themselves.

So what will happen if the Society of St Pius X is allowed to become a Personal Prelature and its situation with respect to the universal Church is "regularised"? Bishop Fellay's recent television interview, which gave rise to speculation about this possibility, is now online with English subtitles (my sample viewing suggests that the subtitles are very accurate to the original French); and this post, though it draws largely on a different interview, appears to me to correctly present the position of Bishop Fellay articulated in the television interview.

Bishop Fellay suggests that a number of things are already in place as far as the every day life of the Society of St Pius X is concerned that represent a degree of "regularisation" of their situation: the permission of Pope Francis that allows their priests to validly / licitly confer absolution in the Sacrament of Penance, and a certain recognition of the (strictly speaking illicit) ordination of priests by local dioceses in the place of ordination are examples. The new situation of the Extraordinary Form created by Summorum Pontificum is also relevant here, in a way that is entirely consonant with the intentions expressed by Pope Benedict in his letter to bishops. But Bishop Fellay is equally clear with regard to the Society's non-negotiables - see from about 07:20 onwards in the television interview and the paragraph "A Battle of Ideas" in this post. In summary, with regard to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council that have been controverted by the Society over the years, there is no movement on the part of the Society whatsoever. The question for Bishop Fellay and the Society is whether a suggestion that these controverted points can in some way not be considered essential as part of what is termed "Catholic" would allow them, from a "regularised" position within the Church, to continue to fight their position over and against that generally accepted in the wider Church and upheld by the conciliar and post-conciliar teaching office of the Church. Though Bishop Fellay sees some signs of this possibility being offered, he appears far from certain as to whether or not it will materialise in a full reality. Given how clear Bishop Fellay is in the interview, it is surprising to me that the speculation about a possible "regularisation" has gained as much traction in the media as it has.

Why do I find the prospect of a "regularisation" of the situation of the Society of St Pius X concerning?

Given the lack of movement of the Society over controverted issues, any "regularisation" is going to legitimise to the wider Traditionalist movement the notion that certain key teachings of the Second Vatican Council are in some way "optional" as far as being Catholic is concerned. (We are not talking here of developments after the Council that are contrary to the substance of its teaching, but of the teaching itself.) Should the Holy See be explicit in ruling this out, it appears to me unlikely that the Society will accept regularisation. Should, in the interests of charity and the promotion of communion and to avoid a rejection of the proposal by the Society, some form of "future discussion" be allowed within the process of regularisation, the precedent of the response to Summorum Pontificum and the more recent advocacy of the Extraordinary Form as the locus of authentic Catholicism, is that the Traditionalist movement will in any case conclude that the controverted issues are "optional" and seek to drive a coach and horses through the attaching conditions, to the confusion both of their own adherents and others (though I suspect that Bishop Fellay himself, on the basis of what I have seen in his television interview, has an intelligence and integrity that would not lead him to encourage such a misapprehension).

Whilst - irony of ironies - one might wish to position the controverted issues at a lower or higher place within a "hierarchy of truths" as the basis for possible future discussions between the Society and the Holy See after "regularisation", and therefore arrive at an evaluation of how central they are to being "Catholic" as a step to "regularisation", that does not make the teaching of the Council optional. But there is a nicety in this that the Traditionalist movement is unlikely to respect.

Is there a right to offend?

There is a certain fashion for saying, in its negative expression, that we have no right to be protected from others giving offence to us; or, in the corresponding positive expression, there is a right of one person to act or speak in a manner that gives offence to another. I heard it again the other day, expressed by a BBC radio interviewer.

Now there is certainly a prudential judgement to be made as to whether or not the giving of offence should be proscribed by law, and thereby attract a criminal or civil sanction before the law. This arises because the law would find it difficult to distinguish between legitimate difference of opinion and an offence of giving offence, however the latter might be defined. So the law, at least in this country, does not proscribe offensive language used towards another and, instead, remains silent on the matter.

But does the absence of legal proscription thereby confer its opposite - that is, does it confer a right to carry out the action that it does not proscribe? Many would believe that it does. A reading of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights would, in my view, suggest otherwise.

Its preamble argues from the "recognition of the inherent dignity .... of all members of the human family", while Article 1 argues that all persons "should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood."

Article 12 reads: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Article 12 has a particular bearing on Articles 18 and 19, which propose the freedom of religious belief and the freedom of belief and expression. Neither of these freedoms can be effectively exercised if people are subject to abusive behaviour or language in their regard; that is, if through attacks on the honour and reputation of their religious or political community, people are subject to mediated attacks on their individual honour and reputation.

Now the content of one person's religion or belief might be such that it is offensive to the religion or belief of another (which is the difficulty that the law faces in proscribing offensive language and behaviour). The expression of difference of opinion in this respect might give rise to offence in a very qualified manner as regards the content of what is expressed. But the recognition of the dignity of the person in the other, and regard for his or her honour and reputation, certainly constrains the manner of the expression of difference. And in this sense, I think the UN Declaration should suggest to us that, no, there is not an unqualified right to be offensive towards others.

Whilst the proscription of the law might extend only to hate crime based on certain protected characteristics, and not to offensiveness itself, there remains the obligation, articulated in human rights instruments, for citizens to maintain the dignity of others, and to respect their honour and reputation. The lack of legal proscription makes the responsibility of the citizen in this regard all the more important.

"Laicite", "Faith", and "Religion"

This last week has seen the first anniversary of the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo, in which a number of the staff of the magazine were killed by Islamists. In passing, I heard a conversation on BBC Radio 4 referring to this anniversary, in which, under the heading of that specifically French notion "laicite", a distinction was drawn between "faith" and "religion".

Now, as the headline to an opinion piece in the Times of 9th January expresses it, "Charlie Hebdo took offensiveness too far". Satire is a literary/journalistic (and indeed political) genre that of its nature offers a degree of offense to those who are its targets. In Britain,  Private Eye is a publication that sits in exactly that tradition. Charlie Hebdo, however, set about its satire of religions with a deliberateness to give offense that was quite marked. Islam was the target which led to the attack on its offices; but the Catholic Church was at times on the receiving end of Charlie Hebdo's ire.

Nigel Biggar's piece in the Times argues that it is quite right that the law of the land should offer a publication like Charlie Hebdo a right to offend without fear of legal penalty. He is also very clear that the attack on their offices, and the killing of the staff of the magazine, was an outrageous atrocity, which called for the solidarity of the world that was shown in the large demonstrations in Paris in the days following the atrocity. But he does point out that what might be allowed by the law of the land is not always what people should actually do, and that there is a moral consideration that intervenes. Freedom is a freedom for and not just a freedom from; the exercise of satire should draw attention to a critical or neglected truth in a situation (which may also cause offense), and not simply set out to give gratuitous offense to those things which others hold sacred. According to Nigel Biggar, Charlie Hebdo's writers "knew and flaunted their legal right to offend; they neglected their moral duty not to".

If I have understood correctly, the conversation that I heard on Radio 4 intended to defend precisely the offensiveness of Charlie Hebdo. It did this first by referring to the idea of "laicite", that is, to the idea that there should be no expressions of religious belief in any aspect of the activities of the state. The anti-religious stance of Charlie Hebdo might be seen as a manifestation of this principle of "laicite". It then suggested that religions, as institutions of essentially political power, could be distinguished from the faith of the individual believer; and I implied from that an argument that it was legitimate to offend the political power, the structures of religion, as that does not involve giving an offence to the individual believer.

The distinction is quite false. Whilst the act of belief is specifically individual, it is nevertheless directed towards an object that is shared with others who profess the same religion. And the nature of the major religions is that their followers form part of a visible community. The distinction is dangerous, too, in that it opposes itself to the provisions of religious freedom contained in, for example, Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 does not admit of a distinction between the right to freedom of religion of the individual and the exercise of that right in community with others, that is, as part of an organised society or religion:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

In the context of the journal Charlie Hebdo, the drawing of a distinction between "faith" and "religion" can be seen in its explicitly secularist intent. It is more subtly present when politicians or public figures here in the UK use a language of "faith" and are shy of using the language of "religion".

Paris, Francis, Dave, NIck and Eric - a retrospective for Charlie

With the passage of time since the events in Paris, and the on-going discussion in the news media and among political leaders, it has become possible to ask more searching questions about the extent to which the right to freedom of expression extends.

I think, for example, that to see the overwhelming response of the French people (and others) in the huge march through Paris and in other gatherings throughout the country, as being in support of freedom of expression understood as the freedom to give offence may be an oversimplification. There was a moving account in the BBC Radio 4 coverage of the march of a Muslim family who had brought along buckets and buckets of white roses (one suspects they ran a florists shop!) to give out to those they met at the march; and of the Jewish marcher who, receiving a flower, then embraced the family as "selfies" were taken. What were their motivations? Anxiety about the freedom of Charlie Hebdo to give offence or an anxiety for friendship with their neighbour? I suspect that an intuition in favour of reconciliation played a part for many; and an intuition in favour of a freedom in the face of, not so much terrorism, as a style of totalitarianism that Islamist terrorism represents.

The statement issued by SIGNIS, the World Catholic Association for Communication, articulated a motivation in favour of freedom as it condemned the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo, and placed that attack against a wider background:

As communicators we reaffirm our commitment to work for a culture of peace which respects the life and dignity of everyone. We also reiterate our support for the fundamental principle of freedom of expression and for all those journalists around the world who face the threat of death or injury in carrying out their profession.

We call on all people of good will to join together to help build a world where those of all cultures and faiths may live and work together in peace.

Pope Francis was perhaps in a unique position among world leaders to be able to  draw attention to the limits that should apply to freedom of expression. His "punch" was very widely reported. In summary, though the law might not proscribe actions that are gratuitously and cynically offensive, and that as a matter of prudence in the protection of the right of freedom of expression, nevertheless those who publish materials or speak have a responsibility to conduct themselves with a respect towards the beliefs of others. Blog-by-the-Sea captures much of this: Free Speech and Respect for Diverse Religious Beliefs (and follow her first link to a Yahoo News livestream of how news organisations have reacted after the Paris attacks).

I don't think Nick Clegg and David Cameron have really understood the issue involved. I heard the former on Radio 4 speak in terms of a "right to give offence"; and more recently the latter has spoken on American TV of a "right to cause offence about someone's religion" in a free society, and that in such a society we have to accept that "newspapers, magazines can publish materials that are offensive to some, so long as it is within the law". Their far too ready assimilation of the right to freedom of expression to a right to give offense is unhelpful to say the least. Equally unhelpful is the unstated presumption that it is the law of the land that defines the boundaries of the rights accruing to the human person.

[See also Catholic Voices reply to some of the UK news media coverage of David Cameron's remarks, and of Pope Francis' original words as mediated by that coverage: David Cameron's missed opportunity to agree with Pope Francis.]

Eric Pickles letter to Muslim leaders has received criticism. It strikes me as being somewhat patronising - and arrogant at the same time. "British values are Muslim values".... err, no, if British values include the right to give religious offense as propounded by the leaders of our coalition government. The letter clearly shows a lack of appreciation of how a religious faith will view its relationship to wider society and to the instruments of state.

What I think Nick, Dave and Eric need to give far more thought to is exactly how the relationship between religion and a free society is to be articulated, be that at the level of the individual religious believer who might be "radicalised" (their term, not mine) or at the level of religious communities as a whole. And so far, I don't think they have even recognised the question.

A brief thought on Charlie

Some Catholic comment has argued that, from a Catholic point of view, "on n'est pas Charlie": see here, for an example.

In quite a thoughtful way, and responding to much the same evidence base as those who have argued that they are not Charlie,  Humblepiety answered the question Je suis Charlie? in the affirmative.

This post at First Things also gives some insight into how the French themselves have reacted to the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo: My Life with Charlie Hebdo. It is also interesting to read the message to the Catholics of Paris published today by Archbishop Vingt-Trois, published here at La Croix.

At one level, the discussion can be held at the level of the legislation in force in a country. Charlie Hebdo 's cartoons are, by all accounts, quite offensive to those who practice the Catholic faith in France as much as some of them have been to Muslims. But a country where the language of religious offense has been enshrined in positive law is Pakistan .... where the blasphemy law does in effect lead to very significant religious persecution of both Muslims and those who live out other religious beliefs.

In the more secular countries of the developed world, the language is that of discrimination and protected characteristics, with actions that disadvantage someone who manifests a protected characteristic being the subject of civil or criminal sanction. There is also a category of legal provision with regard to harassment and the giving of offence. The risk with this situation is that reasonable manifestation of an opinion differing from the prevailing social consensus can be construed as harassment or offence thereby particularly restricting freedom of religious expression in (relatively speaking) secularised societies.

My own thoughts on the question have focussed on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the Declaration reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

The presumption of much of the discussion about Charlie Hebdo has been that the material it publishes falls under this provision of freedom of expression, understood as conveying a right to say and publish pretty much anything that one wishes - regardless. I am not sure that the specification of the right contained in the last clause of Article 19 does in fact convey such a right.

Article 12 of the Declaration reads, with italics added to indicate the element of the Article relevant to the present discussion:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

In the light of Article 18's assertion of the right to freedom of belief and practice for both individuals and communities, I would suggest that attacks upon the honour and reputation of a religious community would equate to attacks upon the honour and reputation of the individuals who are members of that community and so fall under the provision of Article 12. [This is reinforced by recalling that the immediate historical context of the UN Declaration was the events of the Second World War and the Nazi persecution of Jews and other minority communities.] Understood in this way, Article 12 provides a boundary within which the freedom of expression asserted in Article 19 should be exercised. Catholic commentators are, in effect, suggesting that the material published by Charlie Hebdo goes beyond this boundary in attacking the honour and reputation of members of religious communities.

The significance of considering the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that the rights enshrined there arise from the nature of the human person; they are, in the words of the preamble to the Declaration, "equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family". The positive law of a country does not convey those rights; rather, it should protect them. In addition, the language of the Declaration is not that of a particular religious community that, when projected into positive law, undermines the freedom of others; and neither is it the language of a secularised liberalism that risks undermining genuine freedom of expression of information and ideas.

Certainly those who were killed in the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo were subject to a breach of Article 3 of the UN Declaration, which asserts the right of everyone to life, liberty and security of the person. Those who carried out the attack committed a quite heinous crime against the human persons of their victims.

But, though a certain allowance has to be made for the particular genre of journalism that comes under the heading of "satirical journalism" and that, of its nature, gives rise to some degree of offense when you are yourself its particular target (cf the reaction of Eve-Alice Roustang linked above), one can debate whether or not Charlie Hebdo is an authentic representative of the freedom of expression as articulated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Oui, on est Charlie (cf Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme Article 3), mais - peut-etre oui, peut-etre non - en meme temps, peut etre on n'est pas Charlie (cf Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme Article 12).

Pope Francis' Press Conference (2)

Please see this post for my earlier comments about Pope Francis' press conference.

A third point has occurred to me as being worthy of significant comment. It is Pope Francis' explanation of his reasons for wishing to visit Albania. The Pope gave two reasons, two reasons which have a certain contrast to them.

The first is that Albania has been able to establish a government reflecting an inter-religious harmony: Albania represents an example to others of the possibilities of inter-religious dialogue:

First, because they have been able to form a government  – just think of the Balkans, they have been able to form a government of national unity with Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics, with an interreligious council that helps a lot and is balanced.  This is good, and harmonious.  The presence of the Pope wishes to say to all the peoples (of the world) that it’s possible to work together. I felt it as a real help to that noble people.

The second is Albania's history of being a state in which atheism, at a practical level, was formerly part of the country's constitutional arrangement.

... if we think about the history of Albania, in terms of religion it was the only country in the communist world to have in its constitution practical atheism. So if you went to mass it was against the constitution. And then, one of the ministers told me that 1820 churches were destroyed, both Orthodox and Catholic, at that time. Then other churches were transformed into theatres, cinemas, dance halls. So I just felt that I had to go. 

The presence of the Pope also wishes to give a testimony in favour of the part that should be played by religion in public life.

Interesting, eh? 

A "Special Adviser" and "British Values".

There has been some concern expressed at the moves by the Department for Education with regard to the teaching of "British values" in schools (including nurseries) in the United Kingdom. News reports and comment can be found here: DfE consultation,  BBC news, and more recently, here and here; Christian Institute and, perhaps more considered, Catholic Voices.

Alan Craig brings to light another dimension to this question: Rising Gay Christian: Bright, Able and Wrong. Read Alan's post before continuing.

Two thoughts immediately come to mind. What are the implications of Luke Tryl's appointment for the "British values" agenda, particularly for its implementation in schools with a religious designation? And, if instead of Luke Tryl, Nicky Morgan had chosen an orthodox Christian believer as a special adviser, would there have been an uproar? The particular concern about Luke Tryl's appointment is that Nicky Morgan might well receive and act on advice that claims to be consistent with Christian belief when, as Alan points out, it is not.

As the Catholic Voices comment points out:

It is questionable to what extent the state can and should be the arbiter of British values. Values are the wellspring of a society rich in traditions, including mature religious belief, which is at the forefront of the fight against extremism. Faith schools which reflect that mature religion are not the problem, and should be a major part of the solution.

Catholic Voices end their comment with the observation:

The answer to extremism and sectarianism is not secularism, which is a state-imposed attempt to flatten society and shape it in the image of a minority belief. The national educational vision needs to challenge and sift faith traditions; intolerance and violence are distortions and perversions of true religion. This endeavour eschews “top down” solutions to defining the correct values. The challenge requires hard work, listening, and crucially the expertise held within religious traditions. Our values are important, but values do not proceed from the state – they are supported by the state as manifestations of a pluralistic society. Where extremism is an issue, the criticism of a religion lived in a pluralist society is the best, and only coherent, response. 

What strikes me as providing a basis for a common set of values, or principles, for successful living in a religiously diverse society is the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is this Declaration that can provide the basis for the criticism of religion suggested by the Catholic Voices comment - and its terms provide an effective response to extremism (which, in the media coverage, largely remains an undefined term) without representing an imposition by the state of its own values. I cannot see any reason why the UN Declaration should not be part of the expected school curriculum.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Freedom of Religion in the Public and Private Sphere

I have been intending to post on Baroness Warsi's Pope Benedict XVI lecture on "Freedom of Religion in the Public and Private Sphere" for some time. A full text and recording of the lecture can be downloaded from the website of the Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales: here. Do read the full text, or listen to the full recording, before continuing to read my comments that follow.

The motif of Baroness Warsi's lecture was the term "inter-faith imperative" - in other words, the vital importance that those of different religious beliefs should act in concert in responding to the three issues she chose to address in her lecture. In speaking of the persecution of religious minorities overseas, Baroness Warsi said:

....this requires not only Christians speaking up for Christians, Muslims for Muslims, or any faith for its co-religionists.

It requires everyone to speak out against intolerance and injustice.

To speak out and stand up for those who come under attack.

Because, if our response is sectarian then that actually reinforces the divisions.

Listening to these words I was strongly reminded of the Charter 77 movement that emerged in Czechoslovakia (as it then was) during the Communist regime. A feature of this movement was the way in which people of widely different backgrounds - ranging from former/reform Communists to Catholic intellectuals - came together in defence of the human rights of all. The original charter states:

CHARTER 77 is a free, informal and open association of people of different convictions, different faiths and different professions, who are linked by the desire, individually or jointly, to insist on the respecting of civil and human rights in our country and throughout the world, rights recognised for men both by the enacted international pacts, the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and many other international documents against wars, violence and social and spiritual oppression and which are expressed as a whole in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.

Also as I listened I pondered on what might be a clear application of this principle of non-sectarianism in responding to the persecution of minorities, particularly minorities in other countries. It would certainly seem to me appropriate for Roman Catholics and Orthodox Christians to condemn violence against gay rights activists, and against LGBT communities, in Russia, and to condemn the failure of authorities to protect those individuals. See, for example, this CBS News report.

Baroness Warsi continued to apply the principle of the "inter-faith imperative" to responding to intolerance in our own country and to harnessing the energy of faith communities, working together, to build a better society.

Amongst the questions asked at the end of the lecture was one about making the provision of aid by the British Government to other countries conditional on those countries having a good record as far as the persecution of religious minorities, perhaps particularly Christians, was concerned. Baroness Warsi's suggestion, in response, was that not adopting such a stance allowed British representatives to "mainstream" the question of religious freedom in their contacts with other governments - and so when they were raised, they were raised with key people in those governments rather than with more junior officials.

The question I might have liked to ask was, in effect, how the consideration of religious freedom might apply for a person in our own country who did not feel able to apply for a job as a registrar, say, because they would not feel able to officiate at a same-sex wedding. In the past a religious test of adherence to the Church of England was applied for some jobs or universities; nowadays are we instead apply a (religious) test of adherence to a certain secular orthodoxy instead?

Law, Morality and Religion

Sir James Munby's recent lecture was given at an annual conference on Family Law organised by the Law Society. As such, the range of its treatment was limited to that of family law, and not the law in general. The full title of the published text of the lecture is "Law, Morality and Religion in the Family Courts" (the full text can be downloaded as a pdf). That having been said, there are some important implications of his lecture that reach across all areas of the practice of law and its relation to the life of our society as a whole.

Firstly, I think we should recognise the truth of Sir James Munby's observation of the morally pluralistic nature of contemporary society (cf pp.7-8 of the full text in pdf). Sir James perhaps assumes that this plurality is mostly driven by a move away from Christian belief by today's citizens, primarily towards secularism (ie lack of religious belief of any kind). Sir James does acknowledge that there is a pluralism in religious belief in society. I would not argue for a privileged position for Christian belief in our law based on the history of our country; I think that any such position is rooted in the extent and manner in which Christian faith continues to be lived in our land (though, of course, that is not to deny that there are historically Christian roots to much of our law and legal process). However, the question raised by Sir James' observation on this point is not that which he pursues, namely, the promotion of an absence of religious consideration in matters of law. On the contrary, I think it raises the much harder question of what is an appropriate consideration of religion in matters of law. If it is quite correct that (p.10 of full text in pdf)

... reliance upon religious belief, however conscientious the belief and however ancient and respectable the religion, can never of itself immunise the believer from the reach of the secular law.

the real underlying question of how the formulation of  law that will apply to believer and non-believer alike takes in to consideration matters of religion remains unasked. As I might choose to express it, rather than religion becoming less relevant, the question of religion and its proper place in society and law is now alive and well and of greater importance than ever.

Secondly, I think we can ask ourselves exactly what Sir James intended by his use of the term "secular" to describe the role of judges and the nature of the law that applies in our land. In France and Italy, the equivalent term is often "laicite" or "lay-ness", with its slightly different nuance. If by this term Sir James intends that any religious consideration should be over-ridden in law unless it happens to be acceptable on secular grounds - and we can be forgiven for believing that this is his intention despite the assertions of the law's having (p.9 of full text in pdf) "every respect of the individual's or family's religious principles" - then he is in effect suggesting the imposition of a secular "religion". Cranmer weighs into this point of view with gusto:

Except, of course, when it comes to enforcing the state orthodoxy of equality and the inviolable beliefs of secularity. In this new theology, there is no theos: human rights are sacred writ, and salvation is found in the veneration of secularism. Therein lies the true source of freedom and justice.

Except, of course, it is no freedom at all; indeed, it becomes a manifest oppression to Christians seeking to live their lives in spirit and in truth....

It is ironic indeed that we are winding back the clock on the 1689 Act of Toleration and 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act, and moving toward the reintroduction of a religious bar to holding office. Christian magistrates, registrars, paediatricians, GPs, teachers, nurses and foster parents are finding it increasingly difficult to manifest their faith without risk of disciplinary action, dismissal or prosecution for offending the ascendant secular religion.

 What is really required of the law and of judges is that, while not promoting or imposing any one particular religious belief (or, for that matter, secular "religion"), they allow the space in society for those beliefs to flourish. This is what Pope Benedict would have termed an "appropriate secularity". The address in Westminster Hall in 2010 sets out both this and a way of understanding the part to be played by religion in political processes, and by implication in the law and law making process:

Britain has emerged as a pluralist democracy which places great value on freedom of speech, freedom of political affiliation and respect for the rule of law, with a strong sense of the individual’s rights and duties, and of the equality of all citizens before the law...

The central question at issue, then, is this: where is the ethical foundation for political choices to be found? The Catholic tradition maintains that the objective norms governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the content of revelation. According to this understanding, the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply these norms, as if they could not be known by non-believers – still less to propose concrete political solutions, which would lie altogether outside the competence of religion – but rather to help purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the discovery of objective moral principles. This “corrective” role of religion vis-à-vis reason is not always welcomed, though, partly because distorted forms of religion, such as sectarianism and fundamentalism, can be seen to create serious social problems themselves. And in their turn, these distortions of religion arise when insufficient attention is given to the purifying and structuring role of reason within religion. It is a two-way process. Without the corrective supplied by religion, though, reason too can fall prey to distortions, as when it is manipulated by ideology, or applied in a partial way that fails to take full account of the dignity of the human person. Such misuse of reason, after all, was what gave rise to the slave trade in the first place and to many other social evils, not least the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century. This is why I would suggest that the world of reason and the world of faith – the world of secular rationality and the world of religious belief – need one another and should not be afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing dialogue, for the good of our civilization.

But the third, and perhaps most worrying, point to be made about Sir James' lecture is its advocacy of a relativistic standard for the working of judges (p.7 of the full text in pdf):

Today, surely, the judicial task is to assess matters by the standards of reasonable men and women in 2013 - not, I would add, by the standards of their parents in 1970 - and having regard to the ever changing nature of our world: changes in our understanding of the natural world, technological changes, changes in social standards and, perhaps most important of all, changes in social attitudes.

As a letter in today's Times points out:

What if in time these changes render acceptable matters which he currently views as "beyond the pale"?

[cf p.10 of full text in pdf where forced marriage, female genital mutilation and honour violence are listed as being in this category of "beyond the pale"]. One can see here an almost complete refusal to engage at the level of genuine reason, despite Sir James' use of the adjective "reasonable". And its inevitable consequence, as Cranmer cited above appreciates, is the persecution of the minority who do not adhere to the prevailing majority "social attitude". Am I naïve to think that the role of judicial decisions is to uphold the rule of law?

In the specific context of family law that was Sir James Munby's subject, this does have a significant implication. Whatever the historical context of case law cited by him in the first pages of his lecture, and whatever view one might take of those judges in the past who have seen their role as being, at least to a certain extent, one of  upholding morals in society, there are nevertheless strong legal grounds for giving to marriage a preferential protection in law. Article 16 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, states:

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

And we should be clear - as intended by the declaration we are here talking about marriage between one woman and one man, with a view to children, and it is this that is intended by the term family. At the time of its writing, no other meaning would have been intended and it would be quite misleading to interpret the Declaration in any other way. If the law, and the work of judges, does provide this preferential protection for marriage and (authentic) family, it is not a question of judges being guardians of public morality in any sense. It is instead their acting in the interests of a common good that is for the welfare of all in society.

And a final aside. Sir James suggests (pp.7-8 of the full text in pdf) that earlier jurisprudence assumed a society marked by a very high degree of homogeneity in moral outlook, and that the content of this outlook could be easily ascertained. Now, on many of the topics coming before the courts, society no longer has a single, discernible voice. Does not this raise a very significant question with regard to what is nowadays referred to as social cohesion? How much commonality of moral outlook is necessary in order to assure social cohesion, and at what point does a lack of such commonality lead to social disintegration?

Institutionalising heterophobia?

A recent news story about school Sex and Relationships Education policies from the British Humanist Association, reported by the BBC News website under the headline Schools accused of anti-gay language in sex education, turns out to be pretty much a complete non-story. In many of the cases it would appear the schools involved have either not properly reviewed their policies over recent years, or, in doing so, have simply failed to remove now redundant wording. The BBC headline is somewhat misleading when compared to the BHA's own coverage: BHA identifies 45 schools that continue to have section 28-like policies and UK and Welsh Governments launch investigations into schools with section 28-style policies. The substance of the BHA research can be found in a spreadsheat that can be opened from the links at the bottom of both of the above webpages.

As I have already suggested, most of the cited examples look like nothing more than careless reviewing and/or poor drafting of policies. But a number of the examples of wording cited and criticised by the BHA contain an excruciating irony in the way in which they refer to Section 28. The assertion that "Section 28 does not apply to schools" and therefore "does not prevent the objective discussion of homosexuality in schools" appears several times (eg rows 22, 23 and 27 of the BHA spreadsheet). At the time of the parliamentary debates about the repeal of Section 28, I recall receiving responses to correspondence from my then MP which included briefing material worded in pretty much an identical manner (based, I think, on then current Department for Education guidance)... though, of course, it was still vital for the work of schools that Section 28 be repealed.... work out that contradiction if you can!

Whilst clearly any policy wording that refers to Section 28 and the situation that prevailed before its repeal is now redundant and needs to be removed, there does remain another question arising out of the indications that the relevant Government departments are going to investigate schools that have been highlighted as still having "Section 28 like" wording in their policies. How far will those schools come under pressure to include an explicitly pro-homosexual wording in their policies?

It seems to me that the policy provisions need to balance two distinct considerations.

The provisions of Article 16 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows:

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

At the time of the promulgation of this declaration, the term "marriage" would have been understood in no other way than as a union of a man and woman and the term "family" would have been understood as referring in the first instance to the unit of husband, wife and children occurring within marriage (though making allowance for other circumstances such as child bearing outside of marriage or adoptive families).  It would be a quite dishonest interpretation of the UN Declaration to interpret it in any other way. So, if the obligation of states who have signed up to the UN Declaration under paragraph 3 of this article is to be fulfilled, a government intervention with regard to school SRE policies cannot overrule a policy which expresses an appropriate preference in favour of heterosexual marriage. [The provisions of Article 12 of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms essentially expresses the right contained in paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the UN Declaration, qualifying it " according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right".]

The second consideration is that expressed in Article 2 of the UN Declaration with regard to the equality of treatment of all people regardless of "other status":

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

and also expressed in the "principle of non-discrimination" of Protocol 12 of the Council of Europe Convention:

1 The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

2 No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.

The formulation of these two considerations in terms of the UN Declaration and the Council of Europe Convention seems to me quite compatible with the provisions of the Equality Act - see for example the briefing material on that subject at the website of the Catholic Education Service.  It seems to me that:

It is quite possible for a Governing Body to formulate a Sex and Relationships Education policy that

1..... in its defining of curriculum content, gives an appropriate preference to heterosexual marriage - in its relationship to the bringing to life and caring for children, in its representing the proper intentionality of the male/female physical bodily complentarity, in recognition of the wording of the UN Declaration that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society" and in recognition that it remains society's majority experience or reference

2 ..... at one and the same time includes a treatment of non-married family situations and same-sex partnerships in a manner that is accurate and just.

3. ..... in the light of points 1 and 2 contains an appropriate pluralism embracing different points of view, including that in favour of heterosexual marriage and that in favour of same-sex pertnerships, and not imposing a single pro-homosexual perspective

4. ..... that develops an attitude, both on the part of teachers and pupils, that, while not being indifferent to the question of moral right and wrong in this area, is nevertheless non-judgemental and welcoming to those of different life experiences.

[A school whose culture is one in which pupils readily push and shove each other about, in which pupils react in a verbally violent way to any slight, in which pupils regularly have their possessions interfered with by other pupils - that is, a school whose culture includes all the everyday features of bullying and harrassment - will have considerable difficulty in implementing such a policy.  This is not a question about one particular prompt towards bullying of others, but a question about the whole culture of a school environment. The inter-relation of the SRE policy with the work that a school does on bullying seems crucial to enabling different life experiences to be respected.]

If the investigations by Government officials were to challenge a Sex and Relationships Education policy formulated in the terms suggested at points 1-4 above, would it not represent an institutionalisation by the state of heterophobia, under the guise of opposing homophobia?