I suspect that the Sun newspaper's video of Matt Hancock, now the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, in an intimate clinch with a female aide will turn out to be a classic of its genre.
But it does raise a three interesting questions, not specific to the case of Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo, but with respect to a range of surrounding assumptions, what one might term "the zeitgiest".
Is consent on the part of the man and woman a sufficient condition to make an otherwise morally unjust action morally just? If we were to remove the element of consent on the part of Ms Coladangelo to the action shown in the Sun's video clip (Mr Hancock is shown squeezing her bottom), the video would provide an example of precisely the wrong behaviour of a man in a position of relative power towards a woman in the workplace that has been raised by #Me Too. News reporting suggests that both Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo were being unfaithful to their respective spouses, and the consenting nature of their office clinch does not remove the injustice towards spouses that this involves. Even if one sets this consideration aside, there remains a question as to whether or not that squeezing of the bottom in an office clinch represents a respectful behaviour of a man towards a woman, and whether the woman's consent is sufficient to overcome that lack of respectfulness. (I don't intend this as a criticism of Mr Hancock as an individual, but as a more general observation about male/female behaviours.)
The question is of a much wider significance, as much of the contemporary discussion about the safety of women in society, both in social life and in the workplace, focusses on educating men about the nature of consent. But if consent is not a sufficient criterion (though it will be a necessary criterion along with others) for the morality of the actions involved, a focus on consent is not going to resolve the question of the safety and wellbeing of women. We do, perhaps, need to have a conversation about what constitute the boundaries of right and wrong behaviours independently of, and in addition to, the question of consent.
Should we be indifferent to marriage in our public life? Mr Hancock's resignation has with, some emphasis, been connected to his breach of social distancing rules that he himself was responsible for drawing up. In Mr Hancock's own words:
I understand the enormous sacrifices that everybody in this country has made, that you have made, and those of us who make these rules have got to stick by them and that's why I have got to resign.
Reporting, following Mr Hancock's colleagues, have distinguished this reason for resignation from matters of his personal life. The public conversation appears to have a certain style of indifference to the lack of faithfulness to spouses and families shown by Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo; tabloid comment refers to Mr Hancock"cheating on his wife" and Ms Coladangelo as a "cheating aide", but more serious comment is keeping a discreet silence about this. Certainly it would be wrong for public conversation to consist of a witch hunt in the media or hounding on social media; charity is required in this context as in any other, and Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo just happen to represent far more publicly than is typical the circumstances of many others. A certain silence about the specific case might well be the manner in which charity is shown.
But the BBC are carrying this morning what might be considered a piece of lazy reporting, reflecting I think reporting from the Sun, but which nevertheless is indicative:
Mr Hancock has ended his 15-year marriage to his wife, Martha, and the relationship with Ms Coladangelo is understood to be a serious one.
It would appear that Mr Hancock has left his wife with an immediate effect, announcing his departure abruptly as the Sun broke the story of his office encounter with Ms Coladangelo (according to the Sun, at least); but even in civil law, leaving aside any particular belief that one might have about the permanence of marriage vows, a marriage has not ended until a divorce has been granted.
Whilst one would not want to launch witch hunts in any individual cases, is it really healthy for society that the wider public conversation in the case of Mr Hancock and Ms Coladangelo should remain indifferent to the the place of marriage in the life of society? Should not the good of marriage, and expectations around that good, be at least a part of the public conversation?
How should we correctly understand the significance of private life for public life? There are certainly dangers to freedoms when matters of personal life are seen as necessary conditions for participation in public life. But does this mean that how people conduct themselves in their private lives is completely without significance for their public lives? A personal characteristic such as integrity is one that can be common to both a person's private and public life, for example; likewise a characteristic such as honesty. The commonality of such characteristics to both private and public life does mean that I think we should be able to expect more from those who play a larger part in public life than might be the case of those who play a smaller part (recognising that we all risk failing to live up to expectations, those with a large public profile as much as those without).
At the very least, I think we should recognise that private life has some significance for public life, and that this is true for all of us, even if our part in public life is relatively small. It might be of greater significance for those who have a large public profile.
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