March for Life: London 2021

I was not able to take part in this year's March for Life in London on 4th September because of a family commitment - but a report of the march can be found here: March for Life UK - A Resurgence of Life. Videos of the day can be found here: The Talks and Highlights. The videos include testimonies during the rally in Parliament Square, and the talk from Bishop Paul Swarbrick, of Lancaster Diocese.

‘All lives matter! It’s not that some matter more than others but some do need that bit more love, they are so easily overlooked.’

Assisted dying/euthanasia: three thoughts

Earlier this afternoon, I listened to an item on BBC Radio 4's PM programme. Featuring Baroness Meacher and Robert Winston, it discussed reasons for and against proposed legislation to allow assisted dying/euthanasia. If you are reading this within 29 days of my posting, you will be able to listen to the item on BBC Sounds, here. The item occurs immediately after the news summary at the beginning of the programme.

In two distinct ways, it was the references to suffering and burdensomeness in the discussion that have prompted the following thoughts.

What does it mean if I suggest that "I do not want to be a burden on others"?

For a person who experiences an illness that is, to a small or to a greater extent, life limiting, there is merit in keeping as much independence and self-sufficiency in daily living as long as that is possible. But, as with those who have good health, that independence and self-sufficiency is nevertheless lived in a relation to others and not in an individualised bubble - it encounters bus drivers, shop staff, etc, the people of daily living. Our lives are shared with others, even when we are in good health.

There is nevertheless a graciousness in accepting assistance when that becomes necessary, be that social care or medical care. This graciousness has a reciprocal dimension - it does not just exist from the point of view of the person experiencing illness but also finds a reflecting mirror in the people who provide care. And it does not extend just to those who might provide care to a particular patient but extends to wider society too. 

The recognition of this reciprocal graciousness is sadly absent from our society's conversation about end of life care and so, for some, the conversation is framed in terms of being a burden to others. That framing is often exclusively voiced from the point of view of the patient who is ill, which is to neglect the place of those who are potential carers. Surely our society needs to be much better in encouraging this reciprocal graciousness in our care for those experiencing serious illness.

Experiencing illness as you approach the end of life.

Perhaps we could all do well to think to some extent about what it means to experience serious illness and come to the end of our lives. What it does do is create a very special - and that does not mean that it is easy - time for a patient and their relatives/friends to have together. Clearly, different people will experience this differently, depending upon their individual situations; some will find it more difficult than others. But, at least for many, there is an opportunity for a specially shared time together with the patient who is coming to the end of their life. [This isn't theory on my part, but something I have been privileged to see a number of times.] 

What would happen to this time if, because assisted dying/euthanasia were legally permitted, that possibility were admitted to the conversation? Or if, as has happened with legalized abortion, the offering of the opportunity for assisted dying/euthanasia comes to be seen as a normal practice of health care on the part of medical professionals?

It really is not good enough to say that people would have a freedom to choose assisted dying/euthanasia or to not choose it; so why not permit it for those who would choose it. With legalised assisted dying/euthanasia, everyone is put in a position where they have to make a choice, even if that choice is implicit. Everyone's experience of the end of life is affected, and that special time is irretrievably altered for everyone.

Unnecessary suffering.

I believe that it is entirely possible with proper end of life care for a patient not to have to endure unmanageable pain. And, with sufficient commitment to pastoral care, both the patient and relatives/friends can be supported through what might be termed the anguish that accompanies the end of life. If relatives/friends are worried about unnecessary suffering by  the patient, that is a result of poor care both for the patient and for the relatives/friends. And it is not unusual for an end of life patient to "let go" when they are ready, and a key element of their care is recognising when that can come about. In the mean time, that privileged time that is the end of someone's life deserves to be respected rather than curtailed. 

My two thoughts above, of course, do also feed in to this third thought.

Pope Francis speaking to the Italian Forum of Families

Pope Francis' prepared speech is being circulated - but on the occasion itself, he set it aside to respond "off the cuff" or rather, "from the heart", to the introductory words that had been addressed to him by a representative of the participants in the meeting. An English text of the Pope's remarks as actually delivered is not yet available, but the Italian is here. [UPDATE: English text, along with English text of Pope Francis' prepared text, here.]

The London Evening Standard website is citing what will no doubt be seen as the most controversial section of this address:

Quando ero ragazzo, la maestra ci insegnava storia e ci diceva cosa facevano gli spartani quando nasceva un bambino con malformazioni: lo portavano sulla montagna e lo buttavano giù, per curare “la purezza della razza”. E noi rimanevamo sbalorditi: “Ma come, come si può fare questo, poveri bambini!”. Era un’atrocità. Oggi facciamo lo stesso. Voi vi siete domandati perché non si vedono tanti nani per la strada? Perché il protocollo di tanti medici – tanti, non tutti – è fare la domanda: “Viene male?”. Lo dico con dolore. Nel secolo scorso tutto il mondo era scandalizzato per quello che facevano i nazisti per curare la purezza della razza. Oggi facciamo lo stesso, ma con guanti bianchi.

[When I was a boy, the teacher who taught us history spoke of what the Spartan's di when a disabled child was born: they carried them up the mountain and threw them down from there, to look after "the purity of the race". And we were amazed: "But how, how could they do this, poor children!" It was an atrocity. Today we do the same. You can ask yourself why we do not see as many disabled people* on the street? Because the protocol of many doctors - many, not all - is to ask the question "Will it go badly?" I say it with sorrow. In the last century the whole world was scandalised by what the Nazis did to keep the purity of the race. Today we do the same, but with white gloves**".]

That last sentence is hard hitting, to say the least.

But this is one paragraph of a much wider, from the heart, reflection by Pope Francis on the life of families in our own times. The whole is worth a read.

Pope Francis shares the questions he asks when he meets married couples at audiences; he very clearly speaks of marriage between a man and a woman (throughout!) and indicates how it is an image of God to the world; he comments on the analogical use of the term "family" and distinguishes that usage from the specific use of the term in relation to human families, made up of a man and woman with children; he suggests that we need a catechumenate for marriage like that we have for baptism; in an anniversary year of Humanae Vitae, he clearly calls on families to welcome the children that are the gift of God; and, as you would expect, he explains his three key words for married life - please, sorry and thank you - with the need for ensuring reconciliation at the end of the day.

It is probably better to view this address as being "from the heart" rather than "off the cuff". The content clearly arises from a long standing pastoral experience, and reflection on that experience, by Pope Francis.

And do read the whole.


*This is not a literal translation of the word "nani", but I think it will better capture the sense of Pope Francis' use of the word in this context.
**A reference to the surgical gloves of the medical profession.

Chapter and Verse (or Canon and Excommunication)

"It must be true, I saw it in the paper." Or, in the idiom of the 21st century:  "it must be true, I saw it on a blog". It is sometimes interesting to go back to the original sources to investigate an assertion that appears to have become common place simply for having been oft repeated unchallenged on blogs, even Catholic blogs.

Let's try looking at the assertion that politicians who vote in favour of legislation allowing procured abortion should be excommunicated or barred from receiving Holy Communion, if Canon Law and the teaching of Evangelium Vitae are implemented properly.

The relevant Canons of the 1983 Code of Canon Law are considered below.

Canons 915 and 916  address the question of those who should not be admitted to Holy Communion (those "excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin") and those who, on their own initiative, should not come forward to receive (those who are "conscious of grave sin", and who should seek sacramental absolution before receiving).

Canon 1329 considers the situation of accomplices in an action for which the principle actor has suffered a penalty, and it is n.2 referring to latae sententiae penalties that is most relevant:

Accomplices who are not named in a law or precept incur a latae sententiae penalty attached to a delict if without their assistance the delict would not have been committed, and the penalty is of such a nature that it can affect them; otherwise, they can be punished by ferendae sententiae penalties.

Canon 1398 refers to the procuring of a direct abortion:

A person who procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.

Or, as it is translated in my text edition of the Code:

A person who actually procures an abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.

When we turn to Evangelium Vitae, n.62 points out the provisions of both Canon 1329 and 1398, and indicates a reason for the penalty of excommunication:

The excommunication affects all those who commit this crime with knowledge of the penalty attached, and thus includes those accomplices without whose help the crime would not have been committed. By this reiterated sanction, the Church makes clear that abortion is a most serious and dangerous crime, thereby encouraging those who commit it to seek without delay the path of conversion. In the Church the purpose of the penalty of excommunication is to make an individual fully aware of the gravity of a certain sin and then to foster genuine conversion and repentance.

It is n.73 which addresses the situation of politicians who are asked to vote in favour of legislation allowing abortion. The subject is addressed, less in the context of a question of co-operation with any subsequent abortions that might take place, and more in the context of the moral licitness of a law which so fundamentally offends a human right:

Abortion and euthanasia are thus crimes which no human law can claim to legitimize. There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave and clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection....

In the case of an intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to "take part in a propaganda campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it".

Evangelium Vitae n.74 discusses the problem of co-operation that occurs as a result of legalised abortion, and I add emphasis to highlight how Evangelium Vitae understands this co-operation:

Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God's law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing it. This cooperation can never be justified either by invoking respect for the freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law permits it or requires it. Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the acts which he personally performs; no one can be exempted from this responsibility, and on the basis of it everyone will be judged by God himself (cf. Rom 2:6; 14:12). 

This seems to me to represent the juridical situation against which we can evaluate the question of whether or not Catholic politicians who have voted in favour of legislation permitting abortion should be excommunicated or barred from receiving Communion. I would conclude that such a politician has:

cf Evangelium Vitae n.73, has committed a morally illicit act, and that that act goes against a "grave and clear obligation" to do otherwise; that is, provided the act has been undertaken with full knowledge of its gravity and appropriate freedom from coercion, it fulfils the conditions for what is traditionally termed a mortal sin;

In the light of this, he or she is obliged by Canon 916 not to receive Holy Communion without first seeking sacramental absolution

not necessarily met the condition of "obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin" which would justify a sacred minister refusing them Holy Communion; the circumstances might mean they have met this or not and would turn on the judgement of a particular case

not acted such that they might be considered an accomplice in, or a co-operator with, any individual act of procured abortion that might follow upon the enactment of the legislation, and which would attract the latae sententiae excommunication attached to such complicity or co-operation in a directly procured abortion by Canon 1398 cf Canon 1329; their participation in the network of structural complicity described in n.59 of Evangelium Vitae does not constitute that closeness of co-operation with an individual act of abortion that qualifies for the latae sententiae excommunication

Since it does not appear to me to automatically be the case that a politician voting in favour of legislation permitting abortion has fulfilled the conditions that would demand barring from Communion under Canon 915 or excommunication under Canons 1329 and 1398 - they may have done so in some situations or they may not have done so in others - I am unable to share in the opprobrium that some are directing towards bishops in this regard. It seems to me that a first responsibility lies with the Catholic politician under Canon 916 not to approach to receive Communion, and that there might be much better traction to be gained by pointing this out than by attacking bishops. I would also reflect on the purpose of excommunication in favour of repentance and conversion - cf Evangelium Vitae n.62. A pastor could certainly attempt to bring about this conversion in a manner other than by excommunication.

I posted in June on how these kinds of considerations might apply to politicians voting in favour of legislation with regard to same-sex unions: Same-sex marriage: ecclesial aftermath. I concluded that post with two points. The first was to suggest that the fundamental question at stake was less one of a need for an act of authority and more one of acting in a manner that most effectively promoted the witness of the Church to her teaching. I also observed that bishops cannot make up the loss to that witness occurring because the lay faithful do not fulfil their office; and, equally, the lay faithful cannot make up the loss to that witness that occurs when bishops do not fulfil their office. In this sense, I judged that an act of ecclesial authority intended only to reverse the poor witness of Catholic politicians simply is not going to deliver that reversal; of its nature it cannot do so. And, as I am doing here, I suggested that the promoting of obligations under Canon 916 might well represent a more effective path of witness to Catholic teaching.

And as a kind of postscript, I make two further points. Was it really the case that the bishops of Ireland failed to speak out against the legislation that has now been passed by the Irish legislature? I link to the homily of Archbishop Michael Neary at Knock on 1st June 2013. It really cannot be clearer about Catholic teaching, and its appeal to politicians is equally clear in its urging them to put in practice in their voting the beliefs that they might have from their religion. And secondly, the positions expressed by Cardinal Burke might represent an interpretation of the juridical position outlined above - but it does not represent the juridical position itself. One cannot justifiably use Cardinal Burke's essentially personally expressed positions to heap opprobrium on bishops who, quite legitimately, adopt a position just as much in accord with the juridical situation of the question.

To come back to the original question. Is it really true?

Abortion: re-opening a conversation on the level of culture..

The events surrounding the 40 Days for Life vigil in Bedford Square, London, gained much attention in the general media and on Catholic blogs.

Speaking on Woman's Hour on BBC Radio 4 on Friday 30th March, in the morning of the time of prayer led by Bishop Hopes and accompanied by a noisy counter-protest, a spokeswoman for 40 Days for Life, Sarah Denorwel, used the phrase "re-opening this conversation on the level of culture" to describe the nature of what the vigil is about. [The programme is available to listen again on the BBC i-player. I think it is going to remain available, but let me know if this link does not work: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/console/b01dvwqm. The package on the 40 Days for Life vigil is at the beginning of the programme.] Fr Stephen Wang has a good account of participation in the vigil at Bedford Square here.

Amidst all the other descriptors that have been applied to the 40 Days for Life vigil in recent weeks, and by some degree of implication to similar vigils that are held at other abortion facilities, this seems to be the one that best captures what they are about.

They certainly are vigils of prayer and, within my own experience which I have no reason to believe is not the common experience, entirely peaceful. In so far as they also represent a public statement that there is another way than abortion, they also represent a witness to others about that alternative. They do therefore, in a constrained and restricted way, share something of the phenomenon of a demonstration. As we have seen in Bedford Square, the vigils have a cultural and political consequence, though one should say that that consequence is not of their essence.

Seen as a "re-opening of this conversation on the level of culture" the religious nature of the vigil is interesting, too. The Catholic Church is perfectly entitled to engage with the culture of the society in which it lives, whether that engagement is undertaken by the lay faithful or by priests and religious.  These vigils, in which all states of life in the Church - lay, priestly, religious - are represented, show in quite a particular way this engagement of the Church on the level of culture. They are interesting from an ecclesial point of view as an exemplification of the relative competencies of different states of life in the mission of the Church, as well as being interesting from a cultural and political point of view.

But the vigils also have what one might term a personal dimension. This refers to the people - those who work for the abortion facility, those who attend for abortion, those who take part in the vigil of prayer, those who act as pavement counsellors. For each, though perhaps in different ways and for different reasons, the vigil offers a degree of challenge. But it is precisely these people, most directly affected by abortion, who are the bearers of its culture. The "conversation on the level of culture" is also a "conversation on the level of the persons involved" and, as Sarah Denorwel suggested during her contribution to Woman's Hour, the prayer vigils can, away from the media attention, provide a space within which such a conversation takes place.

Stray thoughts on counselling and advising

From time to time I am involved in "casework" type activities: mostly that involves supporting people in circumstances of their professional work. That role often involves using my professional training and experience to advise someone as to a course of action that they should take. There may be some  counselling skills used - sympathetic and accurate listening, for example - but the role is not one of counselling. It involves giving specific advice. There is a second moment in this type of activity, and that is the consent of the person being advised. That person might choose to follow the advice that has been given, but they might also choose not to do so, and there are many things that I can only do with their consent. Expressed at a more philosophical level, there is the necessity of respecting the freedom of action of the other person with respect to the advice that is given.

Another aspect of these situations is the presumptions that are implicit in the relationship that I have to the person I am advising. My working context very often contains an implicit, and sometimes explicit, expectation that I will offer advice, and this expectation underpins the relationship of trust between myself and the other person. This makes it possible for me to offer advice without it going against the freedom of the other person. Often I will have a part in the implementation of the course of action that is followed, and respecting the (implicit) basis of the trust between myself and the other person is critical.

And what happens if the person I am supporting says something to me that I, from an ethical point of view, do not agree with or support?

If I were counselling, at least if I have understood the concept of counselling correctly, the one thing I would not do is advise one course of action rather than any other. Instead, the process is one of supporting the other person to recognise and make their own choice of the course of action.

I do not have first hand experience or knowledge of counselling in the context of crisis pregnancy. What is the intention of such counselling? Is it one of advising, or is it one of counselling in the stricter sense? And does the person approaching a crisis pregnancy counsellor do so with implicit expectations that form the basis of trust underlying the counselling session? Despite the use of the word "counselling", are they expecting to be advised about a course of action? Would client expectations determine their decision to approach one counselling agency rather than another, that expectation then beginning to form a basis for the trust between counsellor and client, and thereby permitting advice in a particular direction rather than another that nevertheless is still respectful of the freedom of the client?  In any situation, how does the dynamic of possibly-advice from the counsellor and consent by the client play out?

I wonder whether the current debate about "post conception advice and counselling" is failing to really reach to the root question of how counselling/advice interacts with the freedom of the person seeking that counselling/advice? And within how we understand that interaction lies the answer as to whether or not an abortion provider or a pro-life agency can offer counselling/advice that is, to use the inaccurate language typical of public debate, impartial. Is not a range of different provisions one of the conditions that would permit this impartiality in its genuine sense?

Dorries-Field (continued)

I am not sure what to make of the Dorries-Field amendment in itself, but it is interesting to see what has been going on in the media.

Nadine Dorries own blog is here, and contains a series of posts that give a feel of things. Perhaps particularly notice this post, and the linked piece a the MailOnline.

Caroline's experience is here.

A quite different report here, again with links to media coverage. The reports do not give enough information to make a clear judgement about the research, but the least that one can say is that there is something here that needs to be considered. As the British Journal of Psychology "highlights"  points out this raises rather a critical question since a significant majority of UK abortions are justified on the basis that they reduce the risk to mental health.

I will add more links as I see them.

"Martin": a life worth living

Earlier this week, the media covered the case of "Martin". "Martin" is nearly completely paralysed, having some eye and head movement that, with the use of a computer, screen and voice generation software, allows him to communicate.  "Martin" is pursuing a legal case that, if successful, would allow professionals to help him kill himself without risk of prosecution. His wife, family and friends who would enjoy some protection from prosecution under current guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service have all indicated that they will not assist "Martin" in killing himself.

In the interview broadcast on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, "Martin" stated that his life was not worth living and that what he wanted to happen was death. An interview with the chief executive of the charity Scope was broadcast immediately after the interview with "Martin", the key argument of that interview being that other disabled people were concerned that, if "Martin" is successful in his court bid, they will feel very vulnerable to pressure from others to take their lives.

I have three connected reflections on this coverage of the "Martin" case.

1. "Martin" clearly feels that his life is not worth living, and stated this clearly in his interview. However, when that judgement is broadcast by "Martin" in a media interview it implicitly asks those who are listening to "Martin" to agree with his judgement and makes it very difficult to express a contrary view in the media. A careful distinction needs to be drawn. It is clear that "Martin" is living a life that is difficult, a life that is far from easy; and it is not licit for those who do not experience his particular situation to make any comment that denies this significant hardship. However, I do think that it is legitimate for us to disagree with the judgment that that serious hardship in life is equivalent to a "life not worth living", because there is a subtle but important distinction between acknowledging the hardship of a life (and being sypathetic about it) and making the additional step of judging it to be worthless. I, for one, do not want "Martin" or anyone else, particularly those caring for him, to think that I agree with his own judgement of his life as being one that is not worth living.

2. The observations of the chief executive of Scope highlight that a legal decision in favour of "Martin" is not in effect just a decision about his own individual case but a decision that then represents a possibility for every other disabled person. The legal decision is not one that just affects the freedom of an individual to have help to kill himself but one that affects the freedom of all disabled people to have help to kill themselves - and therefore it is a legal decision that affects the freedom of all carers in this regard. Put simply, it appears to be a decision about a single case but is in reality a decision that affects society as a whole. There is clearly a legal aspect to this, and the pragmatic question of how the availability of the possibility of help from professionals might well lead to an assumption in favour of that help being provided, but I think there is also an underlying ethical or moral principle. Though he is paralysed, "Martin" nevertheless lives in a society, represented immediately by his carers, family and friends, but also extending to a wider community. Decisions made by "Martin" cannot be isolated from this society as a question of "individual choice" but need to be placed within the framework of the good of that society as a whole. In other words, a legal decision should be made that is in favour of the "common good", which in consequence, is also in favour of the genuine good of the individual case.

3. What is in the "common good" will need to be based on an objective ethical judgement of the good (in a philosophical sense) of the life of the human person. It needs to be clear that, just because life is hard, it is not therefore worthless. The "pastoral moment" that accompanies this "teaching moment" is to say to someone who is seriously ill that there is nothing wrong with the fact that they need others to care for them; and to say to those who care for the sick person that there is a natural dynamic of human society that makes that caring a time of particular value.

It must be true, it was in the Times

From the "Dr Mark" column, on page 9, in the bodysoulhealth section of the Times on Tuesday 1st February 2011. The punchline comes at the end, and still amuses even though I have had a few days to reflect on the possibility that the claim made in the last sentence has some sort of basis in reality. However, there are at least two other points that are worthy of noting in addition to the punchline. Do try and spot them.

Q/A
The doctor at my daughter's university has suggested that she switch from the contraceptive pill to a long-term implant because it is more effective. But I have been worried by recent reports of high failure rates. Is it really the better option?
There is no single best option for everyone - good contraceptive advice involves tailoring it to the individual - but there has recently been a move away from the Pill for younger women because of the high failure rate (if you put 20 teenagers on the Pill, at least one will get pregnant every year).
Implanon (or Nexplanon as it is now called) has a number of advantages over the combined pill: it can't be forgotten, it is not affected by other medicines, or by sickness and diarrhoea, and it doesn't contain any oestrogen (the hormone associated with health problems such as blood clots and breast cancer).
As to recent publicity involving failure rates, I am afraid these were blown out of all proportion. No contraceptive is 100 per cent effective, but Implanon is as close as you can get. Even taking into consideration recent failures (often due to incorrect insertion), it is on a par with, if not better than, sterilisation.

At the time of media coverage of the legal cases with regard to Implanon, I recall hearing a representative of the legal team who had represented women successfully claiming against their medical service providers being very careful to say that the successful claims were all based on evidence of incorrect insertion.

The Times 1st January 2011 (2)

"Pioneering gay fathers set up advice service on surrogacy" is the headline of a piece on pages 26-27.

The millionaire British fathers whose experiences paved the way for Elton John and David Furnish to become parents are to set up an advice service which will help other homosexual couples...

"It is not for same sex couples only. Tony and I have now helpted 38 couples to become parents over the space of six years using surrogacy and apart from those 38 families who have had children, we've helped even more people by putting them in touch with other agencies. I would say 80 per cent of the people have been heterosexual couples."

[Hyperlink not in the Times original report!]

The article portrays the existence of a surrogacy market place in California, which can be used by couples in the UK to work round the illegality of commercial surrogacy here.

Mr Drewitt-Barlow said that he would expect to pay American egg donors, who are often recruited from the country's top universities, between £10 000 and £25 000 for one round of egg harvesting.

"A first-time surrogate costs £20 000 to £25 000", he said. "And what they call a 'proven surrogate', who has had several successful surrogate pregnancies, might get up to £65 000." Then there is the additional cost of IVF, he added.

The figures being quoted are staggering. The wealth of those seeking to use surrogacy to have children is also a cause to stop and think. And, hidden away in the process, is the eugenic implications of choosing egg donors from among those attending top universities.

It would appear that somewhere in this process there is a lot of money to be made.

UPDATE: Paulinus' post here adds something to this coverage.

No to scientism, yes to science: Fr Cantalamessa's first Advent reflection

ZENIT have posted the full text of Fr Cantalamessa's first Advent reflection, given in the presence of Pope Benedict XVI and members of the Roman Curia. In his three reflections this year Fr Cantalamessa is going to address three challenges that are faced by the project of the "new evangelisation" in the cultures of the developed nations. Scientism is the subject of this first reflection, secularism and rationalism will be the subjects of the following reflections.

It isn't really possible to do justice to Fr Cantalamessa's reflection by citing highlights, so you must read the whole to see where the following sections fit in.

Firstly, Fr Cantalamessa's quotation of Blessed John Henry Newman, in the section of his sermon entitled "No to scientism, yes to science":

The new Blessed John Henry Newman has given us a luminous example of an open and constructive attitude to science. Nine years after the publication of Darwin's work on the evolution of species, when not a few spirits around him were disturbed and perplexed, he reassured them, expressing a judgment that anticipated the Church's present one on the compatibility of such a theory with biblical faith. It is worthwhile to listen again to key passages of his letter to canon J. Walker, which still retain much of their validity: "I do not fear the theory [of Darwin] […] It does not seem to me to follow that creation is denied because the Creator, millions of years ago, gave laws to matter. He first created matter and then he created laws for it –laws which should construct it into its present wonderful beauty, and accurate adjustment and harmony of parts gradually. We do not deny or circumscribe the Creator, because we hold he has created the self acting originating human mind, which has almost a creative gift; much less then do we deny or circumscribe His power, if we hold that He gave matter such laws as by their blind instrumentality moulded and constructed through innumerable ages the world as we see it […]. Mr Darwin’s theory need not then be atheistical, be it true or not; it may simply be suggesting a larger idea of Divine Prescience and Skill […]. At first sight I do not see that ‘the accidental evolution or organic beings’ is inconsistent with divine design –It is accidental to us, not to God.”[5 - reference cites a letter of Newman to a correspondent]

Newman's great faith allowed him to look with great serenity at present and future scientific discoveries. "When a deluge of facts, ascertained or presumed, are showered on us, while an infinite number of others already begin to be delineated, all believers, whether or not Catholics, feel called to examine the meaning that such facts have."[6 - reference cites the Apologia pro vita sua] He saw in such discoveries "an indirect relation with religious opinions." An example of this relation, I think, is precisely the fact that in the same years in which Darwin elaborated the theory of evolution of the species, he enunciated, independently, his doctrine of the "development of Christian doctrine." Referring to the analogy, on this point, between the natural and physical order and the moral order, he wrote: "As the Creator rested on the seventh day after completed his work, and yet he still operates,' so he communicated once and for all the Creed at the origin, yet still favors its development and provides for its development."[7 - reference cites the Essay on Development ..]

The section of the reflection entitled "Man for the cosmos or the cosmos for man?", in which Fr Cantalamessa argues that atheistic scientism gives to man a position of complete insignificance in the universe and contrasts it to the position that man has in Christian thought, is for me the most interesting section.

This vision of man also has practical reflections at the level of culture and mentality. Thus are explained certain excesses of ecologism which tend to equate the rights of animals and even of plants with those of man. It is well-known that there are animals that are looked after and fed much better than millions of children. The influence is perceived also in the religious field. There are widespread forms of religiosity in which contact and syntony with the energies of the cosmos has taken the place of contact with God as way of salvation. What Paul said of God: "In Him we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28), is said of the material cosmos....

The creation of man in the image of God has implications on the concept of man that the present debate drives us to bring to light. All is based on the revelation of the Trinity brought by Christ. Man is created in the image of God, which means that he participates in the intimate essence of God which is a relationship of love between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is obvious that there is an ontological gap between God and the creature. However, through grace (never forget this specification!) this gap is filled, so much so that it is less profound than the one that exists between man and the rest of creation.

Only man, in fact, in as much as person capable of relations, participates in the personal and relational dimension of God, he is His image. Which means that he, in his essence, even though at a creaturely level, is that which, at the uncreated level, are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, in their essence. The created person is "person" precisely because of this rational nucleus that renders it capable to receive the relationship that God wishes to establish with it and at the same time becomes generator of relations towards others and towards the world.

Young Fogeys cites a less academic, but perhaps more pastoral section, of the reflection.

Vigil for Nascent Human Life

More by accident than by deliberate intent, I caught Pope Benedict's homily during the First Vespers of Advent/Vigil for Nascent Human Life on the webcast by CTV. I was, at the last minute, looking for the booklet of the celebration in case it contained prayers I could use myself as I prayed the vigil on my own.

The Italian text of the homily is on the Vatican website. My own translation of the following excerpt follows. There are some strong and very challenging words towards the end of this excerpt:

Credere in Gesù Cristo comporta anche avere uno sguardo nuovo sull’uomo, uno sguardo di fiducia, di speranza. Del resto l’esperienza stessa e la retta ragione attestano che l’essere umano è un soggetto capace di intendere e di volere, autocosciente e libero, irripetibile e insostituibile, vertice di tutte le realtà terrene, che esige di essere riconosciuto come valore in se stesso e merita di essere accolto sempre con rispetto e amore. Egli ha il diritto di non essere trattato come un oggetto da possedere o come una cosa che si può manipolare a piacimento, di non essere ridotto a puro strumento a vantaggio di altri e dei loro interessi. La persona è un bene in se stessa e occorre cercare sempre il suo sviluppo integrale. L’amore verso tutti, poi, se è sincero, tende spontaneamente a diventare attenzione preferenziale per i più deboli e i più poveri. Su questa linea si colloca la sollecitudine della Chiesa per la vita nascente, la più fragile, la più minacciata dall’egoismo degli adulti e dall’oscuramento delle coscienze. La Chiesa continuamente ribadisce quanto ha dichiarato il Concilio Vaticano II contro l’aborto e ogni violazione della vita nascente: “La vita, una volta concepita, deve essere protetta con la massima cura” (ibid., n. 51).


To believe in Jesus Christ involves having a new view of man, an view of trust, of hope. For others, experience itself and right reason witness that the human being is a subject capable of understanding and of willing, self conscious and free, irrepeatable and irreplaceable, the peak of all earthly realities, who needs to be recognised as a value in himself/herself and warrants to be welcomed always with respect and love. The human being has the right to not be treated as an object to be possessed or as a thing that can be manipulated as much as one likes, not to be reduced to a mere instrument for the advantage of others and of their interests. The person is a good in themselves and we must seek always their integral development. Love for others, if it is sincere, tends naturally to become a preferential attention for the weakest and the poorest. Along these lines one finds the care of the Church for nascent life, the most fragile, the most threatened by the selfishness of adults and the obscuring of consciences. The Church continually affirms what the Second Vatican Council declared against abortion and all violation of nascent life: "Life, once conceived, must be protected with the greatest of care".

A full English text of the homily can be found at the Catholic Herald site.

Forced abortion in China

John Humphrys has visited China, sent by the BBC's Today programme.

One aspect of his visit was a "package" about China's "one child" policy, and the prospect of its being brought to an end. The audio clip can be found here, though I am unclear whether or not this will be a permanent link or the "listen again" which will cease to be available in seven days time.

In a package built around an interview with a poor farmer who has suffered ill health because of a botched sterilisation operation, John says:

Almost everyone knows someone who has been forced to have an abortion, sometimes brutally; and most middle aged women have been sterilised.

Just to document this fully. The statement above was broadcast at 7.15 am on Thursday 4th November, on BBC Radio 4. The statement was made by John Humphrys, a BBC journalist, in a package recorded as part of a visit to China.

The occurence of forced abortions in China appears, therefore, to be a matter of common knowledge among the people there.

International agencies cannot therefore claim ignorance about the nature of China's population control programme.

Responsible parenthood? "Choice" and the "role of the state"

In a follow up to the announcement at the Conservative Party Conference that a "cap" (with some qualifications) will be introduced, I think in 2013, to the amount that a family might receive in benefit payments, the Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt gave an interview in which he commented on how this might apply in the case of large families. It is worth looking at exactly what he did say, and noting that what he did say was very carefully worded and does not in itself constitute an "attack on large families":

"The number of children that you have is a choice and what we're saying is that if people are living on benefits then they make choices but they also have to have responsibility for those choices," he said.


"It's not going to be the role of the state to finance those choices."

Mr Hunt added: "You can have children but if you are going to ask for support that is more than the average wage that people earn then we're saying no, the state shouldn't support that.

"That's not fair on working people who have to pay the taxes to pay those benefits."

I offer reflections on these remarks under three headings, and a concluding remark.

1. Perceptions of large families

I can't find it at the moment, but a little while ago another blogger posted on the reaction of people in the street or around and about when they encounter a family with lots of children. I have some experience of this when taking my sister's children out to the park for an afternoon - if any of them are still at home, I have sometimes taken great delight in pointing out that there are "two more at home". More than once I have taken them into a cafe for ice cream or cake, and found the staff having a more positive and supportive attitude. In one case, the staff remembered us from when I had taken the children in during the previous summer holiday. I saw the less positive reaction again just a couple of weeks ago, stood as a marshal for LIFE's "Ten Bridges Walk" near the lift on one of the Jubilee Bridges across the Thames, when a family group with several children across a range of ages emerged from the lift.

One part of today's news story is the perception of children, particularly children in families that have more than two children, as being a burden or a cost to society. Jeremy Hunt's observation about it "[not being] fair on working people who have to pay the taxes to pay those benefits" cannot but contribute to this perception, and is unfortunate for that reason.

2. "Choices" or responsible parenthood

When the Culture Secretary spoke about choice with regard to the number of children that parents' have, I do not think that he had in mind the teaching of Humanae Vitae. However, the situation of a family whose circumstances mean that they are reliant on benefits might well be a situation included within the teaching of the following paragraph from Humanae Vitae n.10:

With regard to physical, economic, psychological and social conditions, responsible parenthood is exercised by those who prudently and generously decide to have more children, and by those who, for serious reasons and with due respect to moral precepts, decide not to have additional children for either a certain or an indefinite period of time.

There is, however, clear water between the teaching of Humanae Vitae and the words of the Jeremy Hunt in two respects. The teaching of Humanae Vitae is clear that it is the parents who have responsibility for the decision making, and that they should have the freedom to make those decisions, and that parenthood is equally responsible if it chooses in favour of more children. Whilst Jeremy Hunt is careful to respect this in the first paragraph quoted above, the import of the benefits cap is to provide an element of external coercion in this decision making. I also suspect that the "methods" involved in the choice of family size in the minds of many listening to Jeremy Hunt's words will be methods of contraception, sterilisation or, even, abortion, all of which are incompatible with the teaching of Humanae Vitae.

3. The role of the state

My reflection here returns to the idea that children are seen as a cost or burden to society. Fundamentally, children should not be seen in this way. As future adult citizens, children are a good for society. One aspect of this being a good for society is economic. The children who are supported by benefits now are those who, in the majoirty of cases, will pay taxes in the future that contribute to the common good of the nation. But the economic is not the only aspect of the way in which children are a good for society. Children can already, as children, contribute to the social capital of society; and, as adults, they will in many cases make an even bigger contribution to the good of society expressed in its non-economic aspects. So, even in cases where the support given in benefits now will not be repaid in taxation revenue in the future, there will be a repayment in terms of social capital. Expressed in one way, those who are needy in society are just as much members of society as those who are wealthy and talented. Society has a duty to share with them its financial benefits.

"It is not going to be the role of the state to finance those choices". It can be very much the role of the state, acting through a system of financial benefits, to be the mechanism by which society meets obligations to its members, obligations that would otherwise not be met at lower levels in society (cf an idea of subsidiarity). It should not be the role of the state to provide a coercive preference for one choice over another. What Jeremy Hunt's observation here does not do justice to is the right balance between how "the state" relates to society as a whole.

4. A concluding remark

From a Catholic point of view, there is another consideration to the question of how many children one might have in one's family. This is that children are viewed, and welcomed, as a gift to a married couple and to wider society. This introduces a more theological and explicitly religious dimension to the question of family size, a theological and religious dimension that will inform a Catholic reaction to Jeremy Hunt's remarks.

Nobel Prize for Medicine 2010 - more coverage

The World Federation of Catholic Medical Associations (website not up-to-date) have issued a statement in response to the award of the 2010 Nobel Prize for Medicine to Dr Robert Edwards.

"Although IVF has brought happiness to the many couples who have conceived through this process, it has done so at an enormous cost," a statement from the federation (FIAMC) affirmed. "That cost is the undermining of the dignity of the human person. Many millions of embryos have been created and discarded during the IVF process...

Nobel Prize for Medicine 2010 - further coverage

ZENIT are reporting a statement by the president of the Pontifical Academy for Life in response to the award of the Nobel Prize for Medicine to Dr Robert Edwards.

The president of the Pontifical Academy for Life is acknowledging that the winner of the Nobel Prize in medicine is a scientist to be recognized, but he says he would have voted for other candidates.

Bishop Ignacio Carrasco de Paula released a statement in response to Robert Edwards, the doctor who invented in vitro fertilization, winning today the 2010 Nobel for medicine.

The bishop observed that giving the Nobel to Edwards caused "a lot of support and not a little perplexity, as was to be expected."

"Personally," the prelate added, "I would have voted for other candidates, such as [Earnest] McCulloch and [James] Till, who discovered stem cells, or [Shinya] Yamanaka, who was the first to create an induced pluripotent cell (iPS)."

I note with interest the way in which the other candidates for whom Bishop de Paula would have voted are scientists whose work follows the approach I suggested at the end of my previous post on this subject, referring to the work of Professor Jerome Lejeune.

At the moment I can't find the full text of this statement, but I will link to it when I have found it.

Bridges and Tangents makes an interesting comment on the leader article in today's Times: The power of language in ethical argument.

Nobel Prize for Medicine 2010

Today has seen the announcement that the 2010 Nobel Prize for Medicine has been awarded to Dr Robert Edwards, in recognition of his work in developing IVF techniques for the treatment of human infertility. This prompts a number of reflections that arise from the implications of this award in terms of the ethics and culture of the practice of medicine.

Firstly, one might take the point of view that this award can be seen as a recognition of the scientific work undertaken by Dr Edwards and his colleagues, and that it prescinds from any ethical judgement in favour of or against that work. This point of view would hold that one can separate a recognition of the scientific work from its ethical evaluation. I think there is some validity in this point of view, but only in so far as one might wish to respect the autonomy of the scientific enterprise with respect to the religious sphere, and therefore might wish to refrain from imposing onto the "secular" (in the best sense of that term) scientific world the ethical point of view of one particular religion. On the other hand, though, if by taking this point of view we mean that scientific activity is intrinsically neutral from a moral point of view, and that the evaluation of scientific activity has no ethical component; then I would not consider it valid. Perhaps the most famous discussion of this idea of moral neutrality in science - and rejection of it - is that of C P Snow.

The second thought follows from this first. IVF treatment is subject to different ethical evaluations, as is recognised at least implicitly, if not explicitly, in one sentence of the announcement of the award to Dr Edwards. It might, therefore, have been possible for the Nobel Committee, in making the award, to remain itself neutral with regard to the different ethical evaluations of IVF treatment and therefore of Dr Edwards work. This would not be to suggest that Dr Edwards' work has no ethical "content"; but it would be a reciprocal stance to that of not wishing to impose onto the scientific world the ethical point of view of one particular religion, a reciprocal stance that refrains from imposing onto the wider world of politics, ethics, religion and human culture a single ethical stance from within the scientific community.

I do believe that this kind of respect by science for a kind-of-autonomy of the wider culture represented a real possibility for the Nobel Committee. A careful reading of the press release of the announcement, and a careful listen to the video of the presentation of the award (it is in English!), will reveal no explicit ethical endorsement of IVF. One can, however, read in to the announcement an implicit ethical endorsement, and this arises from three aspects of the announcement. The first is the unqualified description of Dr Edwards contribution as being a "milestone in the development of modern medicine"; the second is the recognition in the announcement that IVF is now an "established therapy throughout the world"; and the third is the way in which the announcement refers to the "joy" that IVF has brought to couples who would otherwise have been childless. The following comment, from the BBC news report carries this implicit ethical endorsement further:

Professor Basil Tarlatzis, past-president of the International Federation of Fertility Societies, said: "This is a well deserved honour.

"IVF has opened new avenues of hope for millions of couples throughout the world.

"Edwards and Steptoe were real pioneers, and the award of the Nobel Prize honours not just their work, but the whole field of reproductive science...

One might do well to notice the implicit nature of the ethical endorsement of IVF expressed in this award; and to notice that it is implicit and not explicit. One could make a case that the award of the Nobel Prize does not, in itself, represent an ethical endorsement of IVF but, more than anything else, is a recognition of a widespread use of IVF in medicine. Whilst that implies an ethical endorsement, that is all that it does; and one can challenge the implication without denying the legitimacy of the Prize.

The Nobel Prize announcement does suggest a very positive view of the experience of IVF treatment by couples who undergo that treatment. Others will have better experience than I have to comment on the experience of repeat IVF cycles, which may constitute a less positive experience.

I think it was about the year 1972 that a French physician committed himself to working in defence of pre-born children, particularly those suffering from trisomy. This followed a television programme in his country that first suggested that those diagnosed within the womb as suffering from a disability might be aborted. That eminent physician's daughter relates how Professor Jerome Lejeune had already spoken at the United Nations in defence of the life of the unborn child. And the evening that he had done that, writing to his wife, he noted:

This afternoon I lost my Nobel Prize

Professor Lejeune discovered the particular genetic abnormality that gives rise to Down's Syndrome. It was the first ever identification of a connection between one particular genetic fault and the illness or disability that it caused. It is the discovery that lies at the beginning of the search for genetic treatments for illnesses, a search that is now expressed in different forms of stem cell research, some that Professor Lejeune would not have considered ethically just and others that he would have supported.

I wonder if, when that research comes to its fruition, and medical treatment undergoes the revolutionary change to genetically based treatments; I wonder if at that point the work of Professor Lejeune will be considered worthy of a Nobel Prize, in the same way that Dr Edwards has been awarded his prize as the results of his work have become an everyday experience in the medical world? Nobel Prizes are not awarded posthumously, so no prize could actually be awarded; but it would be nice to think that Professor Lejeune's contribution to the field were recognised in some way. It would represent a genuine "secularity" of the world of science in respect to a particular ethic of science itself.

Rauol Moat: a need for a careful distinction

This BBC news report gives some idea of the present coverage of Raoul Moat in the media. There are also media reports of Rauol Moat's last words, which suggest that he experienced a real sense of having nowhere "to belong" in the world. Care needs to be taken in basing comments on media coverage alone, and only those involved in the events themselves will really understand fully Rauol Moat's situation.

One has to recognise that Rauol Moat's reported actions - his shooting of three people and his threats against others - were evil. In so far as a person is formed by the way in which they act, this can also suggest that we should recognise that Rauol Moat was in some degree an "evil man". The glorification of his actions is therefore to be deprecated, to be opposed and to be condemned. His actions deserve no sympathy, and should be fully recognised as the evil that they were.

At the same time, the media reports of Rauol Moat's last words and other aspects of the coverage suggest that Rauol Moat was a very troubled person. Fr Ray suggested, and I agree with his suggestion, that perhaps in some way Rauol Moat's situation reflects that in which many in our society might find themselves, though in his case it was lived out to an extreme that is fortunately very rare. It appears that, if we were to identify anyone as being marginalised from our society, that person would be Rauol Moat. That is not to suggest that he is any sense a "good man"; recognising his mariginalisation does not involve that suggestion at all.

Once again, reflecting on events of this nature, I come back to the notion of a mysterium iniquitatis, a mystery of evil. There is something about this evil that we cannot fathom, but can only hope that it is open to redemption.

So, in expressing sympathy for Rauol Moat and leaving flowers in his memory, we might be responding in a quite legitimate way to our sense of this man's marginalisation and anguish, something that might be very encouraging for his family. But we cannot, and should not, thereby be seen as saying that his actions are anything else but profoundly evil.

And if we want to say that Rauol Moat deserves no sympathy, we might be quite legitimately condemning the evil of his actions. But in saying this, we should not say, of any member of our society, that they are marginalised, outside the pale and should remain so.

Both the contributors to Facebook and the Prime Minister might do well to make a very careful distinction.

Taking a Stand on Sexual Health

This is the title of a press release from the Barking, Havering and Redbridge University Hospitals NHS Trust, my local NHS hospital trust. It does not refer to the adoption of a policy position. It refers to the fact that the Trust is spending some of its money to have a stand at an "erotic exhibition". I can't quite think of the best way to describe the Erotica exhibition, though I suspect that the most honest way is to describe it as an exhibition devoted to different degrees of the pornography industry (though I expect that some of the exhibitors would deny this description). The offiicial descriptor is "consumer adult life style" show.

Let's try and apply some logic.

The BHR University Hospitals NHS Trust think it is a good use of their (public) funds to have a sexual health stand at this exhibition. In the words of their press release (my emphasis added): "The stand at Erotica is the first step to confront sexual health head-on, to move with the times and to go outside of the mainstream to find specific audiences". Therefore, they are recognising that "consumer adult life styles" carry a higher risk of infection with an STI and so provide a "specific audience" that needs to be targeted with services.

So why not discourage people from taking part in "consumer adult life styles"? Rather than helping to publicise them, using public funds?

Now one does find it difficult to take seriously a press release which squeezes "first step", "confront sexual health head-on" (oh, dear!) , "move with the times" and "go outside the mainstream" into one and the same sentence. If any readers wish to take on a challenge, perhaps they could try to do the same with a sentence in the comments box (nothing rude please!).

In the 2008-9 financial year, this NHS Hospitals Trust announced  a deficit of £23 million. One would have thought that their advertising budget would have been a key area to be targeted to achieve savings ....

The Tablet (1): coverage of Purdy judgement

The Tablet of 8th August has taken some criticism, though I have some sympathy with the observations of Humble Piety about this. The real skill in media relations is that of answering a point of view without incidentally promoting the view you oppose at the same time - and it can't always be done.

I actually thought that the coverage of the Purdy judgement in this issue of the Tablet was rather sensible and informative, and quite a useful read. The centre piece of this coverage is an article by Professor Jones, director of the Centre for Bioethics and Emerging Technologies at St Mary's University College, Twickenham.

The last sentence of the following extract seems especially telling:

.. in official surveys Dutch doctors admitted ending the lives of 1 000 people a year who had never explicitly asked for euthanasia, and in 2005, in the Netherlands Journal of Medicine, a report claimed that euthanasia had been used illegally on 22 infants with spina bifida. As a result euthanasia advocates rarely mention Holland these days..

And the following is interesting in the light of John Smeaton's post (and the subsequent defence of it), which do, I assume, reflect the stance taken by SPUC on the judgement (their news release is here):

It is not inevitable that the Purdy case will lead to legalised assisted suicide. It is possible for the DPP to put forward conservative and flexible guidelines that do not involve any reference to disability and that do not bring euthanasia closer. The greatest danger at the moment is that this technical ruling gives momentum to the euthanasia movement and makes legalisation seem inevitable. If this is accepted without challenge, then the United Kingdom could sleepwalk in a change in the law.

As matter of media engagement, the less cautious response of SPUC seems to give "momentum to the euthanasia movement and makes legalistation seem inevitable", adding to the presumptive celebrations of Debbie Purdy and her friends on College Green, that had the utterly contradictory (and presumptive) strap line: "It gives me my life back".