Misrepresentation: continued debate about hope in The Times

I found very interesting the letter I copied in this post of two days ago. What I found interesting was the way in which it raised, in the context of the medical profession, the question of hope as part of the discussion of assisted suicide.

Yesterday further correspondence appeared in The Times, replying to Professor Morgan's letter. The first of these letters prompts two questions about the nature of the media, questions which apply to both electronic and print media.

Question 1: As a matter of media strategy, it is not unusual to try to respond to or criticise another writer or speaker without making any explicit reference to what they have said. This is based on the principle that many people might read or hear what you are saying without going to look at what your opponent wrote or said earlier ; you therefore get your point of view over without inadvertently communicating your opponent's point of at the same time. Now, one of the new letters contains the statement: "Professor Gethin Morgan (“Assisted dying and the suicidal state of mind”, letter, Aug 4) displays the assumption, too common among medics, that anyone wishing to die must be mentally ill." If you read Professor Morgan's letter, you will realise that he does no such thing. The letter writer has grossly misrepresented Professor Morgan's letter, so was it ethical for him to write such a letter for publication, even if we admit a legitimacy to the media strategy just described? I would suggest not.

Question 2: Given the possibly un-ethical nature of the letter itself, has the editor who decided to publish the letter also acted un-ethically? Should an editor publish a letter which, as I see it, so clearly mis-represents the contents of an earlier letter? Or does one detect a certain media bias on this question?

To reply to some of the points made in these new letters:

Surely desperate people do need hope? And, as Professor Morgan indicated in his letter, hope does extend beyond the realm of the physical, whereas yesterday's letters limit consideration of hope to just the physical.

Surely a rational thought process leading to a decision for suicide can be quite legitimately the subject of a discussion with a health care professional during an illness? That seems to be a part of the meaning of the word "rational".

The underlying principle of the second two letters appears to be that of respect for autonomy, for the right of an individual to make their own decision. What this avoids is the effect that one person's decision has on others - our decisions in a field such as this affect everyone, both those who might not want to commit suicide and medical professionals who might find themselves having to take part in decisions that they themselves find immoral.

The last paragraph of the third letter opposes considerations of "hope or despair" to those of "compassion and respect for my autonomy". Surely despair is an opposite of compassion, and the promotion of hope is profoundly compassionate?