Saturday 11 December 2021

Freedom and the Common Good

As the governments of the United Kingdom begin to put in place measures in an attempt to limit the increasing number of COVID-19 cases due to the Omicron variant, a narrative from the right of the political spectrum speaks of these measures as a reprehensible denial of our freedom, to be opposed at all costs.

But that is to see the question of freedom only in the negative term of "freedom from ..", rather than in its positive term of "freedom to ...". In this positive conception, the proper end of the exercise of human freedom is that which is true and good, that is, our own good and the good of our neighbour. This is expressed in n.365 of the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

365. Why does everyone have a right to exercise freedom?
The right to the exercise of freedom belongs to everyone because it is inseparable from his or her dignity as a human person. Therefore this right must always be respected, especially in moral and religious matters, and it must be recognized and protected by civil authority within the limits of the common good and a just public order.
That reference to "the limits of the common good" defines the purpose towards which the exercise of human freedom in society is directed, and recognises a qualification to any idea that freedom means freedom to do whatever one likes in the exercise of rights, regardless of the interests of our neighbour.

A similar qualification to the exercise of human rights and freedoms exists in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where Article 29 n.2 reads as follows, the term "the general welfare in a democratic society" expressing the idea of a common good:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

So a narrative which seeks to oppose the establishment of measures in law intended to limit the adverse effects of COVID-19 variants in society only on the grounds of their being infringements of human freedom is a partial perspective, neglecting the recognition in major human rights instruments of the limitation to that freedom that can be applied in the interests of the common good. And as a partial perspective, pursued alone, it becomes an ideology of freedom rather than an advocacy of true freedom.

[One might want to argue that the proposed measures are not actually required by the common good... but that is to then enter into a debate about the (scientific) evidence, and that is a rather different position to adopt.]

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