What marriage is (1): in the world

No ideology can erase from the human spirit the certainty that marriage exists solely between a man and a woman, who by mutual personal gift, proper and exclusive to themselves, tend toward the communion of their persons. In this way, they mutually perfect each other, in order to cooperate with God in the procreation and upbringing of new human lives.

This is how the document of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Considerations regarding proposals to give legal recognition to unions between homosexual persons defines the nature of marriage in one of its early paragraphs. The paragraph contains a number of interesting points, apart from its very obvious assertion of marriage as being between a man and a woman.

1. The reference to "ideology".

The term "ideology" has, at least so far as I can tell, fallen into disuse in the years since the fall of the Communist bloc. In part, this may be as a result of a disillusionment with (objective) idealism in public life, and the favouring instead of a style of pragmatism that, though it appears to address social needs and inequality, nevertheless lacks an objective content. Post-modernism is a word sometimes used to describe this.

I think that is is legitimate to use the term "ideology" to describe the role of LGBT activism in UK society. Much of the public debate is conducted in the language of equality, and it can be very persuasive. But behind it is a campaign against "heterosexist assumptions". This, for example, is a paragraph from a suggested model policy of one of the teacher trade unions:

All areas of the curriculum and resources will be closely monitored to see that they do not rely on heterosexist assumptions and that they contain no homophobic material.

One has no objection to checking that teaching materials do not contain homophobic materials; but removing "heterosexist assumptions" represents a step change from the notion of equality as it would be understood by most people.

Another policy statement from the same union defines heterosexism in this way:

The concept of heterosexism includes a focus on both homophobia and sexism and therefore enables us to account for the underlying cultural prejudice against lesbian, gay and bisexual people. This prejudice is firmly tied to dominant male and female identities that rely on heterosexuality as a norm. Heterosexism includes attitudes, behaviour and practices that constitute heterosexuality as the norm. At the same time, heterosexism reflects and encourages a dislike or feeling of superiority towards girls and women.

[....] believes that we can only successfully tackle sexism and homophobia by seeing them as two integral parts of the wider cultural problem of heterosexism.

One should recognise in the pressure of LGBT activists for same sex marriage an attempt to gain a further recognition in law of an "ideology" which would not be recognised or accepted, I suspect, by a significant majority of UK citizens.  The heterosexual remains the norm; a small minority of our citizens self-identify as LGBT, and the language of human physiology speaks for itself. One could at this point cite any of the severe critiques of "ideology" offered by Vaclav Havel in his essay The Power of the Powerless, but let this one suffice. In the context of this post, one needs to read its reference to "the power structure" as applying to structures of the media and the influence of organisations such as Stonewall rather than its original application to the power structures of Communist regimes, and there is no intention to make any comparison between LGBT ideology and that of Communist totalitarianism.

As the interpretation of reality by the power structure, ideology is always subordinated ultimately to the interests of the structure. Therefore, it has a natural tendency to disengage itself from reality, to create a world of appearances, to become ritual.

 2. The idea of "mutual personal gift".

Now I think one has to draw a careful distinction between the use of the term "mutual personal gift" by the authors of the Sacred Congregation's document and the use of the apparently similar term "commitment" in the context of same sex unions. The idea of a "mutual personal gift" delineates an objective content of what is exchanged in the marriage vows; it does not just refer to a motivation on the part of the couple. There certainly is a motivation on the part of the couple; but the matrimonial consent offers an objective content over and above the motiviation of those involved.

The objective content is, of course, defined in relation to the purposes of marriage discussed below. It cannot be reduced to "commitment", even be that faithful and lifelong. To slightly adapt the recent words of Archbishop Nichols, a "commitment" is not a "marriage".


3. The reference to "the communion of their persons".

The term "communion of persons" can be readily appropriated to the word "love". For the advocates of same sex unions this becomes the question: "If we love each other, why can't we marry?" Once again a distinction needs to be drawn between the objective content of the term "love" or "communion of persons" and what can be the subjective experience indicated by the same term. To "love" is not to have fulfilment of my desire or wish for the other person, be that desire sexual in nature or other than sexual in nature. It is to want, and then to act in favour of, what is for the good of the other person. This might begin with an attraction and a desire, but if it stops there it is not love. The "communion of persons", love, requires the movement from eros to agape of which Pope Benedict writes in Deus Caritas Est.

Now the good of the other demands a respect for the nature of the "mutual personal gift" that is marriage and, not only for same sex couples but for others too, this means that the objective content of what it means to love should take a precedence over the subjective.


4. The idea of "mutual perfection" and the "procreation and upbringing of new human lives" as being the purpose(s) of marriage.

In some ways, this last point is the hinge on which the three previous considerations turn. The ideology of the LGBT activists is directly at odds with this statement of the fundamental purposes of marriage. This expression of the purpose of marriage also defines the objective content that comprises the mutual gift of persons that is the marriage covenant. And, in both its elements and not just in one or other of them on its own, it defines the objective good of the other person that is represented by authentic married love.

I was not sure whether or not to have the "(s)" at the end of the word "purpose". There is a certain history in the Catholic Church of the discussion of primary and secondary purposes of marriage. I think I would prefer to see "mutual perfection" and "the procreation and upbringing of new human lives" as different elements of one purpose of marriage, the compromising of one element have a concomitant compromising of the other.

It is worth recognising, as do the opening sentences of the Sacred Congregation's document quoted above, that:

The Church's teaching on marriage and on the complementarity of the sexes reiterates a truth that is evident to right reason and recognized as such by all the major cultures of the world.

It is not just the Catholic Church, but  a weight of history and culture that recognises this nature of marriage. This defines the meaning of the term "marriage" and, though there might be a change to the law to allow "same sex marriages", those unions cannot have the same meaning to them as marriage understood as it is by the generality of human society.

Archbishop Nichols on Marriage

A clear statement by Archbishop Nichols of his position with regard to marriage and same sex unions can be found at Catholic Voices: Keep Focus on Marriage.

The audio of the press conference at which Archbishop Nichols made his original (controversial) remarks about same sex unions can be found here. There is an answer to a question in the second "Question and Answer" file, as well as remarks by Archbishop Nichols in his presentation in the first audio file.

It is useful to listen to the whole, if you want to get a full idea of what Archbishop Nichols was saying.

Different offices

According to the Code of Canon Law - and I cite it by virtue of it being an expression of ecclesiology in practice ("applied ecclesiology", to use a term I have encountered at Maryvale Institute) rather than out of any sense of legalism - the office of a Bishop is described as follows. The emphasis added is mine.

Can. 375 §1. Bishops, who by divine institution succeed to the place of the Apostles through the Holy Spirit who has been given to them, are constituted pastors in the Church, so that they are teachers of doctrine, priests of sacred worship, and ministers of governance.  

§2. Through episcopal consecration itself, bishops receive with the function of sanctifying also the functions of teaching and governing; by their nature, however, these can only be exercised in hierarchical communion with the head and members of the college.

And the office of the lay faithful is as follows, again with my added emphases:

Can. 225 §1. Since, like all the Christian faithful, lay persons are designated by God for the apostolate through baptism and confirmation, they are bound by the general obligation and possess the right as individuals, or joined in associations, to work so that the divine message of salvation is made known and accepted by all persons everywhere in the world. This obligation is even more compelling in those circumstances in which only through them can people hear the gospel and know Christ. 

§2. According to each one’s own condition, they are also bound by a particular duty to imbue and perfect the order of temporal affairs with the spirit of the gospel and thus to give witness to Christ, especially in carrying out these same affairs and in exercising secular functions....

An appropriate expression of ecclesial communion is achieved when each, the Bishop and the lay faithful, exercise the office that is proper to them. The one should not attempt to exercise the office of the other since by doing so they will thereby cease to exercise properly their own office. I would go further and suggest that, should there be a failure in the exercise of their office by one party, it really is not possible in any case for the other to successfully step in and exercise that office in their stead. An appropriate ecclesial life is therefore utterly dependent on the Bishop and the lay faithful exercising their own proper office conscientiously, since the lay faithful cannot make up for the failing of a Bishop and a Bishop cannot make up for the failing of the lay faithful.

It is useful, I think, to put this consideration alongside the words of Pope Benedict XVI in Westminster Hall, when he spoke of the relationship between religion and public life and, implicitly, of how we might view the relationship between the Catholic Church and public life:

The Catholic tradition maintains that the objective norms governing right action are accessible to reason, prescinding from the content of revelation. According to this understanding, the role of religion in political debate is not so much to supply these norms, as if they could not be known by non-believers – still less to propose concrete political solutions, which would lie altogether outside the competence of religion – but rather to help purify and shed light upon the application of reason to the discovery of objective moral principles. This “corrective” role of religion vis-à-vis reason is not always welcomed, though, partly because distorted forms of religion, such as sectarianism and fundamentalism, can be seen to create serious social problems themselves. And in their turn, these distortions of religion arise when insufficient attention is given to the purifying and structuring role of reason within religion. It is a two-way process. Without the corrective supplied by religion, though, reason too can fall prey to distortions, as when it is manipulated by ideology, or applied in a partial way that fails to take full account of the dignity of the human person.

Reading this in the context of the respective offices of the Bishop and the lay faithful, one can perhaps identify the office of the Bishop particularly with the task of purifying and shedding light upon the application of reason to discovering - and teaching - the objective moral principles that might refer to an issue such as civil partnerships/same sex marriage. The task of then devising particular political or legislative solutions that put these principles into practice, and advocating for them in society, can be identified with the office of the lay faithful. The effectiveness of a Catholic engagement with an issue like civil partnerships/same sex marriage depends on the two different offices being correctly fulfilled by their respective parties. The one party is not going to be able to do the tasks appropriate to the other and have it work effectively for the mission of the Church. A thundering episcopal condemnation may sometimes be appropriate, but not always.

As readers may have realised by now, this is intended as my contribution to the controversy surrounding Archbishop Nichol's remarks about civil partnerships and same sex marriage. Caroline has links to the original sources in the first paragraph of her post Into the maelstrom. I have a lot of sympathy with the analysis in paragraph 4 onwards of Caroline's post. In my own family, there was at one time an exact analogue of Caroline's "Auntie A" and "Auntie B". I recall at the time of the first talk of civil partnerships contributing to discussions along the lines that legislation with respect to pension rights, inheritance etc could have been framed in terms of economic and social inter-dependence (common life). Married status would very clearly meet the requirements of such legislation, even if it was not specially privileged in the legislation. The test could equally be applied to a same sex couple living together, quite regardless of any questions of sexuality or sexual orientation. And, as Caroline points out, to relatives sharing the same accomodation and a common life, and to carers. I also share Caroline's assessment of Archbishop Nichols' remarks, which might be described as confusing, but do deserve a more careful response than that being offered by some. The comments on Caroline's post are also worth perusing.

There are two, perhaps opposing, questions which appear to me to arise from this controversy, one a question for the lay faithful, the other a question for the Bishops. The first is the danger that those who are critical of Archbishop Nichols' remarks (on this matter as on others) set themselves up, perhaps unconsiously but perhaps deliberately, as a kind of "alternative teaching office" to that proper to the Bishop. There are one or two Catholic blogs that I will not include in my side bar precisely because I feel that this is what they are doing. As I have tried to argue above, it is not for the lay faithful to try to take on the office of the Bishop, and they cannot effectively achieve it in any case, and will undermine the exercise of their own proper office at the same time. I wonder also whether this is a danger to which the "traditionalist" Catholic is more prone than others.

The second question is that of discerning what is the most effective way for a Bishop to exercise his office of teaching in a time dominated by broadcast and electronic news media. Is the press conference really the most effective way of presenting Catholic teaching - the purifying of reason proper to religion in the realm of public debate - about civil partnerships and same sex marriage? Is an episcopal blog a more appropriate way? Whatever the medium of its propagation, I do think that this could come back to two means that have been held in regard in the history of the Church's life. I think of the homily and of the pastoral letter. Should Bishops be willing to preach, and to preach regularly, in fulfilling their teaching office? And should they be willing to write more pastoral letters, letters using the principles of Church doctrine to assess the proposals of public debate? One of my favourite examples of someone who did this is Archbishop Oscar Romero, who wrote four long and  detailed pastoral letters during his time as Archbishop of El Salvador, and the way in which he did that provides a good example that can be followed. The form of the homily and pastoral letter should allow a more complete and careful treatment of Catholic teaching, not prone to the potential confusion of the media interview or Q and A session at a news conference.

As a concluding thought, it might be worth reflecting on exactly what Pope Benedict XVI attempted in his address in Westminster Hall. He could very easily have condemned the legislation that the UK Parliament has passed with regard to abortion and same sex unions. But he didn't. Instead, he spoke about another piece of legislation passed by that Parliament, namely, the abolition of the slave trade. And he spoke about the principles that underpin the engagement of the Catholic Church, and religion in general, in public affairs.

Year of Faith (7): "By faith ..."

I had intended to finish my earlier series of posts about the Year of Faith that Pope Benedict XVI announced with the following excerpt from his motu proprio Porta Fidei. I have added emphases to draw attention to the beauty of this passage, which can be summarised as giving an account of how the Church has experienced its life "by faith":

One thing that will be of decisive importance in this Year is retracing the history of our faith, marked as it is by the unfathomable mystery of the interweaving of holiness and sin....

During this time we will need to keep our gaze fixed upon Jesus Christ, the “pioneer and perfecter of our faith” (Heb 12:2..... In him who died and rose again for our salvation, the examples of faith that have marked these two thousand years of our salvation history are brought into the fullness of light.

By faith, Mary accepted the Angel’s word and believed the message that she was to become the Mother of God in the obedience of her devotion (cf. Lk 1:38). Visiting Elizabeth, she raised her hymn of praise to the Most High for the marvels he worked in those who trust him (cf. Lk 1:46-55). With joy and trepidation she gave birth to her only son, keeping her virginity intact (cf. Lk 2:6-7). Trusting in Joseph, her husband, she took Jesus to Egypt to save him from Herod’s persecution (cf. Mt 2:13-15). With the same faith, she followed the Lord in his preaching and remained with him all the way to Golgotha (cf. Jn 19:25-27). By faith, Mary tasted the fruits of Jesus’ resurrection, and treasuring every memory in her heart (cf. Lk 2:19, 51), she passed them on to the Twelve assembled with her in the Upper Room to receive the Holy Spirit (cf. Acts 1:14; 2:1-4).

By faith, the Apostles left everything to follow their Master (cf. Mk 10:28). They believed the words with which he proclaimed the Kingdom of God present and fulfilled in his person (cf. Lk 11:20). They lived in communion of life with Jesus who instructed them with his teaching, leaving them a new rule of life, by which they would be recognized as his disciples after his death (cf. Jn 13:34-35). By faith, they went out to the whole world, following the command to bring the Gospel to all creation (cf. Mk 16:15) and they fearlessly proclaimed to all the joy of the resurrection, of which they were faithful witnesses.

By faith, the disciples formed the first community, gathered around the teaching of the Apostles, in prayer, in celebration of the Eucharist, holding their possessions in common so as to meet the needs of the brethren (cf. Acts 2:42-47).

By faith, the martyrs gave their lives, bearing witness to the truth of the Gospel that had transformed them and made them capable of attaining to the greatest gift of love: the forgiveness of their persecutors.

By faith, men and women have consecrated their lives to Christ, leaving all things behind so as to live obedience, poverty and chastity with Gospel simplicity, concrete signs of waiting for the Lord who comes without delay. By faith, countless Christians have promoted action for justice so as to put into practice the word of the Lord, who came to proclaim deliverance from oppression and a year of favour for all (cf. Lk 4:18-19).

By faith, across the centuries, men and women of all ages, whose names are written in the Book of Life (cf. Rev 7:9, 13:8), have confessed the beauty of following the Lord Jesus wherever they were called to bear witness to the fact that they were Christian: in the family, in the workplace, in public life, in the exercise of the charisms and ministries to which they were called.

By faith, we too live: by the living recognition of the Lord Jesus, present in our lives and in our history.

The different elements of this "by faith" are not just a history that we can read and try to follow. These elements describe the ecclesial constitution of Christian faith, the nature of Christian life as being a participation in the "communion of saints" made visible in a human community. It is an account of an ecclesial and theological reality, as well as being a historical account. So, for example, I would argue that a "Marian character" and the three evangelical counsels form just as much parts of what it means to be the Church as do the Apostolic and missionary characters.

SSPX and "the preamble"

Regular visitors to this blog will recognise that is author is not a "traditional" Catholic. Well, he is traditional, but he isn't that sort of "traditional", he is the other sort of "traditional".

I therefore look at the discussions taking place between representatives of the Holy See and the Society of St Pius X with a certain detachment. The interest that I do take in those discussions is not so much for their consequences for the Society of St Pius X but for their implications for the Church as a whole. The confidential nature of the "doctrinal preamble", understandable when seen solely in the context of the dicussions between the Holy See and the said Society, is problematical in this latter context. If we all have a stake in the content of the preamble and in the outcome of the discussions based upon it, then surely we should all be allowed to contribute to the discussions in the Church about it, rather than the Society of St Pius X having some kind of exclusive access to the discussion while "non-traditionalists" remain excluded.

In saying this I am not at all suggesting that the confidentiality of the "doctrinal preamble" should be breached. However, that the Society of St Pius X appear to be not accepting it is something that I learn with a certain sense of relief. I had not gained the impression when it was first proposed to the Society that there was room for re-negotiating its content, though the Society seem to be suggesting that "clarification" may in effect offer opportunity for some re-negotiation. Also very helpful in my view is the publication of the article in L'Osservatore Romano, and carried at EF Pastor Emeritus, by one of the participants from the side of the Holy See in the discussions with the Society of St Pius X. This article addresses the question of assent to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, and I think that we can take it as an "indicator" of the negotiating position of the Holy See in its discussions with the Society of St Pius X. Together, Bishop Fellay's interview and Mgr Ocariz's article can be seen as part of a process that allows the wider Church a stake in the discussions between the two parties. One can speculate on how far Mgr Ocariz's article it is representative of the content of the "doctrinal preamble"; one might also see it as a reply to the remarks of Bishop Fellay of the Society of St Pius X, and a careful comparison of Bishop Fellay's interview with Mgr Ocariz' article shows at least one specific point of rebuttal (with regard to whether or not Vatican II is seen as offering doctrinal teaching).

What I find encouraging in the article by Mgr Ocariz is its clear indication that the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, including that on its "controversial" points, and that of the four pontificates since the Council, is not going to be sacrificed in the discussions with the Society of St Pius X. The boundary to the "space for legitimate theological freedom", from the point of view of the Holy See, appears to be quite tightly defined.

It is my own view that it is the Catechism of the Catholic Church that should provide the practical "rule of faith" required by the unity of the Church. This sufficed for the Ordinariate of Our Lady of Walsingham as former members of the Church of England entered into full communion with the Holy See. Why should not the same "rule of faith" apply to the Society of St Pius X?

".. truly the earth's culmination .."

The Meditation of the Day for Thursday of this week in Magnificat is from the writings of Fr Alfred Delp, and opens as follows (my italics added):

That God would become a Mother's son and that a woman could walk upon this earth, her body consecrated as a holy temple and tabernacle for God, is truly the earth's culmination and the fulfilment of its expectation ...

Oh, that this was granted to the earth, to bring forth such fruit! That the world was permitted to enter into the presence of God through the sheltering warmth, as well as the helpful and reliable patronage of her motherly heart!

I added the italics to draw out the closeness of the perspective of this passage to that promoted by FAITH, and exemplified in this article by Fr Nesbitt: The Christ Centred Vision of Creation: The Witness of Scripture and Tradition, and this one by Fr Stephen Boyle: The Centrality of Christ In the Plan of Creation.    

World AIDS Day - a cause for hope

Media coverage that I have heared - on the radio - over the last couple of days suggests the following two thoughts for World AIDS Day.

The first thought is that a HIV positive status, or the AIDS illness that can follow from it, is now considered to be a treatable illness. It should no longer be seen as a terminal illness or, as it might be expressed in a popular culture, a "death sentence". In developed nations, the condition that attaches to this is that those who are HIV positive receive an early diagnosis, and so there is a call for people to be willing to be tested for their HIV status. The BBC news report here suggests that something like one in five people in the UK decline a HIV test when it is offered.  In under-developed nations, the condition is that of ready access to appropriate retro-viral drugs. At a cultural level, one would hope that this development will help to remove the unnecessary stigma that can attach to a positive HIV status..

The second thought relates to the existence of HIV/AIDS among the gay population. One report I have heard on the radio in the last couple of days made a particular call for gay men to be willing to be tested. According to a report on the BBC news website, based on data from the Health Protection Agency:

The number of people living with HIV in the UK reached an estimated 91,500 in 2010, up from 86,500 the year before, with a quarter of those unaware of their infection.

Some 6,660 people were newly diagnosed with HIV in the UK last year.

Data revealed infections likely acquired within the UK almost doubled in the last decade from 1,950 in 2001 to 3,640 in 2010 and exceed those acquired abroad.

This rise is mostly due to infections acquired among men who have sex with men, who remain the group most at risk of HIV infection in the UK, says the HPA.

In 2010, over 3,000 gay men were diagnosed with HIV - the highest ever annual number. One in 20 gay men is now infected with HIV nationally and in London the figure is one in 11.

Our political and social culture needs to be realistic in its response to this specific aspect of the HIV/AIDS situation, whilst at the same time not putting at risk the potential gains with regard to reduced stigma attaching to a positive HIV status that comes from better treatment and management of those diagnosed as being HIV positive.